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BACK TO THE FUTURE WITH THE UNIFORM CODE OF
MILITARY JUSTICE: THE NEED TO RECALIBRATE THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MILITARY JUSTICE
SYSTEM, DUE PROCESS, AND GOOD ORDER AND
DISCIPLINE
ANTHONY J. GHIOTTO*

ABSTRACT
The military justice system is unique. At the center of this system is
not a judge or even an attorney, but rather a military commander. The
commander has the authority to charge service members with offenses,
refer these cases to courts-martial, select the panel member who will hear
the case, and to then review the findings and sentences adjudged by the
court-martial. The primacy of the commander stems from the dual goals of
the military justice system: to preserve good order and discipline, while also
ensuring justice is achieved. Recently, though, reformers have argued that
commanders have failed the system. Highlighting the recent increase in
military sexual assaults and the rash of service member misconduct during
deployment, these reformers argue that commanders should be removed
from the military justice system. This paper argues, however, that it is not
the commanders that failed the military justice system, but rather the
military justice system that failed the commanders.
For commanders to ensure service members abide by their orders, they
must be able to effectuate punishment that is credible and transparent.
Simultaneously, this punishment must be viewed as legitimate. A balanced
military justice trinity weighing good order and discipline, due process, and
the military justice system provides the commander with these tools. The
current system, though, does not present this balance. The gradual increase
of due process into the military justice system has rendered the court* Anthony J. Ghiotto serves as a major in the United States Air Force Judge Advocate
General’s Corps and is currently assigned to Aviano Air Base, Italy, where he is the Deputy Staff
Judge Advocate. He received his Juris Doctor from Emory University School of Law in 2005 and
his Bachelor of Arts from the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana in 2001. This article
was originally written in partial fulfillment of the graduation requirements for Air Command and
Staff College. The author thanks Colonel Kenneth M. Theurer for his mentorship, direction,
supervision, and guidance. Additionally, the author thanks Major General (Ret.) Charles J.
Dunlap Jr., Professor Victor M. Hansen, Dr. Michael Weaver, and Major Clayton O’Connor for
their insights, criticisms, and suggestions. Lastly, the author dedicates this article to Colonel
(Ret.) James W. Russell III; he may not have agreed with anything in this paper, but he is sorely
missed and hopefully proud.
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martial an obsolete tool, and consequently commanders rarely utilize it.
Thus, commanders lack the capability to deter service member misconduct.
This paper argues that only by restoring the balance, specifically by scaling
back the extra-constitutional due process rights afforded to accused service
members, can commanders effectively combat the increase in service
member misconduct.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the wears of Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States continues
to possess the world’s preeminent military force. And at the core of any
successful military unit is good order and discipline. Good order and
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discipline is, as George Washington remarked, “the soul of an Army.”1
During the recent decade of war, however, cracks emerged in the military’s
foundation of good order and discipline, both in garrison and in the
deployed environment. Two events have come to symbolize these cracks:
the killing of twenty-four innocent Iraqi civilians by service members in
Haditha, Iraq, and the dramatic increase in service members sexually
assaulted by other service members.2
The intense nature of these events captured the public’s attention as to
the apparent breakdown of good order and discipline within the military,
and the military’s responses to these events have led to calls for dramatic
reforms. In Haditha, only one of the Marines involved was convicted in a
court-martial, which resulted in the convening authority approving no
Regarding sexual assault, two Air Force convening
confinement.3
authorities set aside the sexual assault convictions of two officers,
undermining the sexual assault reform efforts of senior military leaders.4
1. John S. Cooke, Military Justice and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, ARMY LAW.,
1, 6 (Mar. 2000).
2. DEFENSE LEGAL POLICY BOARD, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE
IN COMBAT ZONES: MILITARY JUSTICE IN CASES OF U.S. SERVICE MEMBERS ALLEGED TO HAVE
CAUSED THE DEATH, INJURY OR ABUSE OF NON-COMBATANTS IN IRAQ OR AFGHANISTAN 154-82
(2013). On November 19, 2005, Marines reported a small arms fire attack from homes within
Haditha, Iraq. Id. at 155. The battalion proceeded to clear several homes. Id. The Marine Corps
battalion suffered an IED attack, resulting in the death of a popular battalion Marine and two other
Marines wounded. Id. In the operation’s aftermath, an investigation revealed that twenty-four
unarmed Iraqi non-combatants, including women, children, and elderly, were killed by the Marine
battalion. Id. at 156. In November 2013, the Department of Defense released that it received
3,553 complaints of sexual assault within the military for the first three quarters of fiscal year
2013—a 50% increase from the total number reported for fiscal year 2012. See Jennifer
Steinhauer, Reports of Sexual Assault Rise Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2013,
http://www nytimes.com/2013/11/07/us/reports-of-military-sexual-assault-rise-sharply html?_r=0.
Similarly, a Department of Defense survey revealed that in 2011, 26,000 service members related
in the survey that they were the victims of sexual assault, whereas only 19,000 answered as such
in 2010. Id.
3. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 154-55, 164. Marine Corps
commanders preferred charges against six of the battalion members, including the battalion
commander. Id. at 154-55. Prior to court-martial, however, charges were dropped against five of
the members, including the battalion commander, who instead was forced into early retirement.
Id. Staff Sergeant Frank Wuterich faced a general court-martial, where he was charged with three
specifications of violating Article 92, Dereliction of Duty; nine specifications of violating Article
119, Voluntary Manslaughter; two specifications of Article 128, Aggravated Assault; and one
specification of Article 134, Obstruction of Justice. Id. at 164. In the midst of trial, Sergeant
Wuterich and the convening authority reached a pretrial agreement where, in return of Sergeant
Wuterich’s plea of guilty to one specification of dereliction of duty, the convening authority
would dismiss the remaining charges and their specifications. Id. Sergeant Wuterich was
sentenced to confinement for ninety days, reduction in grade to E-1, and forfeiture of $984.06 pay
per month for three months. Id. Pursuant to the pretrial agreement, the convening authority did
not approve the confinement portion of the punishment. Id.
4. See James Risen, Hagel to Open Review of Sexual Assault Case, N.Y TIMES, March 11,
2013, http://mobile nytimes.com/2013/03/12/us/politics/hagel-to-open-review-of-sexual-assaultcase html. In November 2012, a panel of military officers found Lt. Col. James Wilkerson guilty
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Multiplied by several acts of sexual misconduct across the military
departments, the military command’s failure to adequately address these
events resulted in Senator Kirsten Gillibrand introducing legislation to
dramatically alter the military justice system.5 Supported by several legal
scholars and victim advocates, Senator Gillibrand proposed removing the
commander’s authority to prosecute service members for any offense that
could result in an excess of one year of confinement, with some exceptions
for military specific offenses, and instead placing such authority in a judge
advocate with a rank of O-6 or above.6
Although Senator Gillibrand’s bill failed to receive the sixty Senate
votes necessary to survive a filibuster, fifty-five senators voted in favor of

of sexual assault in violation of Article 120, UCMJ. Id. The members sentenced Lt. Col.
Wilkerson to one year of confinement and a dismissal from the Air Force. Id. The conviction
stemmed from an allegation by a civilian female who reported that Lt. Col. Wilkerson sexually
assaulted her when she was asleep at his home. Id. After his conviction, the general court-martial
convening authority, Lt. Gen. Craig Franklin, set-aside the conviction pursuant to his authority
under Article 60, UCMJ. Id. Reportedly, he subsequently attempted to promote Lt. Col.
Wilkerson and provide him with a command. Id. In February 2012, Lt. Gen. Susan Helms setaside Capt. Matthew Herrera’s sexual assault conviction. Craig Whitlock, General’s Promotion
Blocked Over Her Dismissal of Sex-Assault Verdict, WASH. POST, May 6, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/generals-promotion-blocked-over-herdismissal-of-sex-assault-verdict/2013/05/06/ef853f8c-b64c-11e2-bd07-b6e0e6152528_story.html.
Previously, a panel of officers convicted Capt. Herrera of sexually assaulting a female Air Force
lieutenant and sentenced him to sixty days of confinement and a dismissal. Id.
5. S. 967, 113th Cong. (2013). Section (2)(a)(3) provides:
[T]he disposition of charges pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be subject to the
following: (A) The determination whether to try such charges by court-martial shall be
made by a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces designated in accordance with
regulations prescribed for purposes of this subsection from among commissioned
officers of the Armed Forces in grade O-6 or higher who – (i) are available for detail
as trial counsel under section 827 of title 10, United States Code (article 27 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Id. at § 2(a)(3).
Section 2(a)(1) further provides:
This provision is “with respect to charges under Chapter 47 of title 10, United States
Code (the Uniform Code of Military Justice), that allege an offense, other than an
offense specified in paragraph (2), that is triable by court-martial that chapter for
which the maximum punishment authorized under that chapter includes confinement
for more than one year . . . .
Id. at § 2(a)(1).
The excluded offenses, per section 2, are:
(A) An offense under sections 883 through 891 of title 10, United States Code (articles
83 through 91 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice). (B) An offense under
sections 893 through 917 of title 10, United States Code (articles 93 through 117 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice). (C) An offense under section 933 of title 10,
United States Code (article 133 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
Id. at § 2(a)(2).
6. See Richard L. Able et al., Law Professor’s Statement on Reform of Military Justice
(2013), http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/conference/LawProfessorsStatement.pdf.
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the bill.7 Most strikingly, the bill received bipartisan support, with fortyfour Democrats and eleven Republicans voting for the bill.8 Beyond the
Senate vote, sexual assault and the military’s supposed inability to address
it now permeate American culture, serving as the subject of the Academy
Award nominated documentary The Invisible War and as a major plotline
on House of Cards, a popular television show.9 The military departments
must heed the Senate vote and the continued public interest as an indication
that reform to the military justice system is coming, and it may be dramatic.
Acknowledging that reform is inevitable, the military departments must
first answer the why question—why the increase in the severity and
frequency of service member misconduct? Only after answering that
question can they move onto the how question—how do we fix it? These
are complicated questions, with each proposed answer having second and
third order effects, but the military departments possess the strategic
framework to tackle them.
Military professionals tend to turn to Carl von Clausewitz when faced
with perplexing strategic questions.10 In On War, Clausewitz views war as
a “paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and
enmity.”11 Each of these prongs “are like three different codes of law,
deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one
another.”12 Indeed, “[a] theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix
an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such
an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.”13 As such,
Clausewitz burdens the strategist with developing “a theory that maintains a

7. Darren Samuelsohn, Juana Summers, & Anna Palmer, Kirsten Gillebrand’s Sexual
Assault Bill Derailed, POLITICO (March 6, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/senatemilitary-sexual-assault-vote-104372 html.
8. Id. This vote proved especially bipartisan with the Republic Senate Majority Leader,
Mitch McConnell, and leading Tea Party affiliated Senator, Ted Cruz, voting in favor of the bill,
along with several prominent liberal Democrat senators, including Senator Gillibrand. Id.
9. On season 2 of House of Cards, a Netflix streaming online show, the primary female
antagonist, Claire Underwood, related that a Marine General previously sexually assaulted her,
causing other victims to come forward. HOUSE OF CARDS (Netflix 2014). Consequently,
emboldened by her husband’s position as the Vice President of the United States, she advocated
for the passing of a bill that would take the disposition of sexual assault cases out of the military
chain-of-command and increase civilian control of the military justice system. Id. This plot line
lasted the entire season and proved to be essential to the show’s main plot.
10. See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1989). Military doctrine is peppered with references to Clausewitz,
especially joint and Army publications. Similarly, Clausewitz forms the foundation for much of
the military departments’ development education.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between
three magnets.”14
The Clausewitzian trinity can be applied to the rash of service member
misconduct to not only understand why it has occurred, but also to guide
reform efforts. Instead of a paradoxical trinity composed of primordial
violence, hatred, and enmity, however, service member misconduct consists
of a paradoxical trinity composed of good order and discipline, the military
justice system, and due process.
Military justice, good order and discipline, and due process are all
unique and operate independently of one another. Simultaneously, they
depend upon one another; the military justice system serves as the legal
structure by which the military enforces good order and discipline. And
due process provides legitimacy and a sense of justice to both the military
justice system and good order and discipline. Problems arise when reform
efforts fail to maintain the appropriate balance between these tendencies
because strengthening one prong potentially weakens the other two.
As the governmental branch ultimately responsible for the military
justice system, Congress failed to maintain an appropriate balance between
these three tendencies. Following World War I, Congress incrementally
increased the amount of due process afforded to accused service members.
With the increased strength of the due process prong, the military justice
system and good order and discipline suffered. The military justice system,
specifically the court-martial process, became an ineffective tool for
commanders to effectuate good order and discipline. In turn, good order
and discipline waned, culminating in the recent breakdowns. Therefore, the
military departments should drive Congress to aim its reform efforts at
developing the appropriate balance between good order and discipline, the
military justice system, and due process.
Section II analyzes the historical development of military justice. It
highlights the fact that military justice originally consisted of a military
justice system conflated with good order and discipline: a system with few
due process rights afforded to accused service members. Gradually,
though, Congress and the military departments increased the role of due
process, resulting in the military justice trinity present today. Section III
assesses the impact that the increased role of due process has on the military
justice system. It argues that increases in due process have severely limited
commanders’ use of the court-martial as a tool to preserve good order and
discipline.
Section IV examines the relationship between the
marginalization of the court-martial as a tool for good order and discipline.
14. Id.
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It posits that without the court-martial commanders are limited in their
ability to deter misconduct within their units. Section V provides
recommendations designed to balance the military justice trinity.
II. THE FORMATION OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE TRINITY:
FROM A MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM DOMINATED BY GOOD
ORDER AND DISCIPLINE TO ONE DOMINATED BY DUE
PROCESS
Depending on whom one speaks to, the United States’ system of
military justice is either the gold standard15 or “is to justice as military
music is to music.”16 The difference in opinion stems from the military
justice trinity, which is composed of due process, good order and discipline,
and the military justice system. In different times, one prong may weigh
more heavily than the others, and interested observers, including service
members, policy makers, and scholars, assess the system based on which
prong is most important at that time. The military justice system is
dynamic, and the relationship between each prong is ever-changing. If one
narrative stretches throughout the history of military justice, however, it is
the increased role of due process. At its inception, military justice was not
a trinity, but consisted of a military justice system designed solely to
effectuate good order and discipline. The Articles of War, the founding
legislation for military justice, constricted due process in favor of
commanders being able to exercise quick and severe discipline. As the
services grew and more Americans encountered the military justice system,
service members began to demand due process rights. The Congress and
the military responded with incremental due process rights that
subsequently created the trinity and today’s system.
A. THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM UNDER THE ARTICLES OF WAR
The Articles of War proved to be a lasting and flexible contribution to
the development of the military justice system. Arising during the
Revolutionary War, the Articles of War guided military justice into the
Mexican-American War, the Civil War, World War I, and World War II.
During each of these wars, the Articles of War placed the primacy of the
commander—often the battlefield commander—at the center of military
justice. Another constant, though, during the Articles of War period was
15. Kenneth M. Theurer and James W. Russell, III, Why Military Justice Matters, 37 THE
REPORTER 10 (Summer 2010).
16. ROBERT SHERRIL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC IS TO MUSIC 2
(1970). The quote derives from French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau. Id.
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the call for reform. After each major conflict, veterans, who often saw the
abuses of unbridled command discretion firsthand, returned with calls for
reform. It is from these calls for reform that due process entered into the
military justice system.
1. The Articles of War: The Primacy of Good Order and
Discipline
The Constitution provides Congress with the authority “to raise and
support Armies,” “to provide and maintain a Navy,” and “to provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining” the militia.17 Under these provisions,
the nation’s founders signaled that the authority for military justice resided
not in the civilian Article III courts, but rather with Congress.18 Pursuant to
this authority, Congress implemented the Navy and Army Articles of War,
which provided the legal mechanism to ensure good order and discipline
within the nascent American armies and navies.19
By balancing an accused service member’s due process rights against
the need for good order and discipline, these Articles captured General
William Sherman’s oft quoted description of military justice:
The object of the civil law is to secure to every human being in a
community all the liberty, security, and happiness possible,
consistent with the safety of all. The object of military law is to
govern armies composed of strong men, so as to be capable of
exercising the largest measure of force at the will of the nation.
These objects are as wide apart as the poles, and each requires its
own separate system of laws, statute and common. An army is a
collection of armed men obliged to obey one man. Every
enactment, every change of rules which impairs the principle
weakens the army, impairs its values, and defeats the very object
of its existence. All the traditions of civil lawyers are antagonistic
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Supreme Court has afforded great “deference to the
determination of Congress made under its authority to regulate the land and naval forces.” Weiss
v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994). See also James B. Roan and Cynthia Buxton, The
American Military Justice System in the New Millennium, 52 A.F. L. REV. 185 (2002).
18. David A. Schlueter, The Military Justice Conundrum: Justice or Discipline?, 215 MIL.
L. REV. 1, 16 (2013). See also Chappel v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302 (1983) (quoting Gilligan v.
Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973)) (“[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in
which the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the
. . . control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments . . . .”); Victor
Hansen, Changes in Modern Military Codes and the Role of the Military Commander: What
Should the United States Learn from this Revolution?, 16 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 419, 427
(2008).
19. See WILLIAM T. GENEROUS, JR., SWORDS AND SCALES 5-13 (1973). See also Hansen,
supra note 18, at 427.
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to this vital principle, and military men must meet them on the
threshold of discussion, else armies will become demoralized by
even grafting on our code their deductions from civil practice.20
Legal scholars in the post-Civil War era formalized Sherman’s view of
military justice solely as a means to ensure strict discipline. William
Winthrop, an Army Judge Advocate, published the leading treatise on
military justice at the end of the 19th Century.21 In his treatise, Winthrop
provided: “It follows that courts-martial must pertain to the executive
department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive
power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander-in-Chief, to
aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing
discipline therein.”22
As such, the Articles of War conflated good order and discipline with
the military justice system, finding little role for due process rights. A
commander had the authority to charge service members without
conducting an investigation or rendering an oath, and accused service
members did not possess the right to an attorney.23 In fact, attorneys were
marginalized from the process. The Articles did not require a military
judge or a defense attorney.24 Nor did they even require the prosecutor be
an attorney.25 The commander selected the court officers who would
decide the case, and the commander had the sole authority to review the
case upon its completion.26 At that stage, the commander possessed the
authority to set aside a conviction and to find a service member guilty if the
court-martial found him not guilty.27 The commander was subject to little,
if any, review of his determinations.28 With the absence of due process,
commanders utilized courts-martial to rapidly mete out punishment and
secure good order and discipline.
2. World War I and the Calls for Reform
At the onset of World War I, service member misconduct remained
governed by nearly the same Articles of War present since the Revolution.
The events of the war led some to question whether the military justice
20. Schlueter, supra note 18, at 21 (quoting Letter to General W. S. Hancock, President of
Military Serv. Inst., from W.T. Sherman (Dec. 9, 1879)).
21. GENEROUS, supra note 19, at 7.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 8.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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system required modernization—specifically increased due process rights
for accused service members. Brigadier General Samuel Ansell led the
calls for reform. Ansell served as the Army’s acting Judge Advocate
General (“JAG”), after the Army’s JAG, Major General Enoch Crowder,
left to serve temporarily as the Provost Marshall General.29 Upon assuming
his position, Ansell “suffered from a number of frustrations.”30 Primarily,
he was “repeatedly shocked by the sentences handed down by Army courtsmartial, and his utter powerlessness to do anything to correct them.”31 A
case involving thirteen African American soldiers who were tried,
sentenced to death, and executed for mutiny before any higher authority
was even notified of the trial especially concerned Ansell.32
Ansell’s experiences during World War I led him to advocate for a
dramatic overhaul of the military justice system. He advocated for a
“radically new concept of military law, one which would divorce the courtmartial from the commanding officer and move into the vacuum thus
created lawyers, civilianlike rules of procedure and evidence, and a
complex system of appellate review to filter out whatever remnants of past
attitudes still remained.”33 To Ansell, the Articles of War, with their lack of
due process, “was designed for the Government of the professional military
serf of another age.”34 Spurred by Ansell’s advocacy, Congress introduced
sweeping legislation that would (1) require commanders to make charges
under oath and thoroughly investigate the charges before being brought to
trial, (2) establish a “court judge advocate” who would perform the duties
of trial judge, (3) provide that court members would be selected by the staff
judge advocate from a panel of officers supplied to him by the convening
authority, (4) require a sufficient number of enlisted court members when
the accused was enlisted, (5) abolish the reviewing power of the
commanding officer except for clemency authority, and (6) establish a court
of military appeals where judges would have life tenure and cases involving
certain severe punishments would warrant automatic review.35
Congress declined to pass Ansell’s dramatic reforms. However,
Congress did provide additional due process protections to accused service
members in the 1920 Articles of War.36 The new Articles “greatly changed

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
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pretrial procedure by requiring sworn charges, a ‘thorough and impartial’
investigation, and expert legal advice for the commanding officer before he
convened a court.”37 Furthermore, the 1920 Articles created a “law
member” who served as a voting member of the court and was assigned
some duties of a traditional trial judge, mainly the authority to rule on the
admissibility of evidence and to instruct the court on its responsibilities and
on the applicable law.38 Also, the new Articles required defense attorneys
for all “but the lowest form of court-martial.”39 Additionally, the 1920
revisions prevented commanders from imposing findings of guilty when
accused service members were acquitted in trial.40
Despite the increased due process, the 1920 Articles of War continued
to emphasize the interconnectedness of the military justice system and good
order and discipline at the cost of due process. The Articles afforded a “law
member,” but did not require that this individual actually be an attorney.41
These provisions also limited the law member’s power by allowing the
other court members to out-vote any ruling or determination made by the
law member.42 Most dramatically, the first page of the revised Articles of
War provided that military law is due process of law to those in the military
service of the United States.43 To support this statement, the Articles cite to
two Supreme Court cases: Reaves v. Ainsworth and U.S. ex rel. French v.
Weeks.44 In both these cases, the Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he
courts are not the only instrumentalities of government. They cannot
command or regulate the army.”45 Consequently, under these cases, due
process rights for accused service members arise not out of the Constitution
or the courts but from Congress’s power to regulate the military.
3. World War II and the Increased Call for Due Process
Wars tend to serve as watershed moments for military justice, whereas
interest in military justice wanes in peacetime. Although the trinity
remained largely untouched after World War I, World War II proved to be a

37. Id. at 10.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Articles of War: Hearing on S. 64 Before the S. Comm. on Military Affairs, 66th Cong.
36 (1920).
44. U.S. ex rel. French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326 (1922); Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296
(1911).
45. Reaves, 219 U.S. at 306; see also U.S. ex rel. French, 259 U.S. at 335 (finding that civil
courts could not overturn decisions of military tribunals acting under Congress’s power).
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dramatic turning point in military justice. During the course of the war,
approximately 80,000 service members were convicted by general courtmartial, “an average of nearly sixty convictions by the highest form of
military court . . . every day of the war.”46 Overall, courts-martial of all
types returned approximately two million convictions during the war.47
These dramatic numbers, coupled with the overwhelming force used to
fight the war, brought many Americans face-to-face with the military
justice system. When faced with the reality of a military justice system
with limited due process, returning service members called for reform.
These calls for reform led the department secretaries to establish
several committees to examine military justice during World War II. 48 The
majority of these studies reflected flaws in the military system, mostly
focusing on the lack of due process. For example, the Vanderbilt
Committee found fault with seven major areas: (1) a lack of attention to,
emphasis on, and planning regarding military justice matters as a whole; (2)
not enough qualified service members to serve as court officers and
officials; (3) commanding officers frequently dominated the courts; (4)
inadequate defense counsel; (5) sentences were frequently
disproportionately severe; (6) discrimination between officers and enlisted
members, both in the preferral of charges and in handing down convictions
and sentences; and (7) inefficient and inadequate pretrial investigations.49
Another study lamented that in its review of 2,115 cases, nearly half of
them contained “flagrant miscarriages of justice.”50 A civilian judge at this
time described a 1948 court-martial as “saturated with tyranny.”51
A consensus arose from these committees: the military justice system
and good order and discipline could not be conflated with one another. The
committees began to view military justice as a balance between the military
justice system and good order and discipline. Professor Edmund Morgan,
the head of the Vanderbilt Committee, stated before Congress: “we are
convinced that a Code of Military Justice cannot ignore the military
circumstances under which it must operate but we are equally determined
that it must be designated to administer justice.”52 Similarly, the Vanderbilt
Committee report concluded:
46. GENEROUS, supra note 19, at 14.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 15-17.
49. Id. at 16.
50. Id. at 18.
51. ELIZABETH LUTES HILLMAN, DEFENDING AMERICA: MILITARY CULTURE AND THE
COLD WAR COURT-MARTIAL 14 (2005).
52. Schlueter, supra note 18, at 29-30 (quoting INDEX AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 606 (2000 Reprint, Hein)).
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A high military commander pressed by the awful responsibilities
of his position and the need for speedy action has no sympathy
with legal obstructions and delays, and is prone to regard the
courts-martial primarily as instruments for enforcing discipline by
instilling fear and inflicting punishment, and he does not always
perceive that the more closely he can adhere to civilian standards
of justice, the more likely he will be to maintain the respect and
the morale of the troops recently drawn from the body of the
people.
Some of the critics of the Army system err on the other side and
demand the meticulous preservation of the safeguards of the civil
courts in the administration of justice in the courts of the Army.
We reject this view for we think there is a middle ground between
the viewpoint of the lawyer and the viewpoint of the general.53
Thus, at the end of World War II, justice was no longer viewed merely
as an impediment to good order and discipline. Instead, critics of the
system began to assert that justice could enhance good order and discipline
by providing a sense of legitimacy and fairness to the commander’s efforts
to preserve good order and discipline. The focus then turned to how the
military justice system could achieve that balance by providing a sense of
justice and fairness to the process while also enabling the commander to
preserve good order and discipline. Reformers found the answer in due
process and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”).
B. REFORM IS HERE: THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE AND
THE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL
After World War II, reformers demanded revision of the military
justice system. They called specifically for the addition of the due process
rights afforded to accused individuals in the civilian world. The issue soon
became what the scope of these reform efforts would be and who would
lead the charge: Congress or the Executive branch. Reformers achieved
compromise and balance through two acts of legislation: the UCMJ and the
Manual for Courts-Martial.
1. The Uniform Code of Military Justice
Congress enacted the UCMJ in an attempt to strike the appropriate
balance between good order and discipline and the military justice system.
53. Id. at 29-30 (quoting REPORT OF WAR DEPARTMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
MILITARY JUSTICE 5 (1946), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/report-wardept-advisory-committee.pdf).
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Its primary method of doing so was by increasing the due process rights
afforded to accused service members. The Congressional debate over the
UCMJ focused on the role of commanders.54 Advocates of reform argued
in favor of placing increased restrictions on the commander and thereby
increasing the role played by attorneys.55 In contrast, opponents of reform
insisted that “[y]ou cannot maintain discipline by administering justice” and
warned about the costs of increasing the role of attorneys.56 Ultimately, the
UCMJ passed into law reflected a compromise between these views.
Commanders would prefer charges, direct the pretrial investigation, refer
charges to trial, and appoint counsel, law officers, and court members.57
Commanders would also serve as the first “reviewer” of the results of
trial.58 Notably, the UCMJ failed to require attorneys to serve as military
judges.59 Nonetheless, the UCMJ provided for a lawyer at the pretrial
investigation, prosecutorial and defense lawyers at the trial and appellate
level, and an all-civilian Court of Military appeals.60 Overall, the UCMJ
established “a procedural and substantive criminal law that applied across
the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard” with an
increased emphasis on due process rights.61
2. The Manual for Courts-Martial
Once President Truman signed the UCMJ into law in 1950, military
attorneys began to advocate for a Manual for Courts-Martial (“MCM”).62
To many, the UCMJ amounted to a “skeleton whose framework will be
filled in by a law manual.”63 The drafters of the UCMJ anticipated this
need for a manual in drafting the UCMJ and created Article 36, which
54. See generally INDEX AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY
JUSTICE (2000 Reprint, Hein). See also GENEROUS, supra note 19, at 34-53.
55. GENEROUS, supra note 19, at 46-49.
56. Id. at 48. Representative Frederick Wiener served as an Army Judge Advocate during
World War II and rose to the rank of colonel. During the debate concerning the UCMJ, Rep.
Wiener became a vocal supporter of the Articles of War motivated by the belief that “[t]he object
of armed forces is to win wars, not just fight them [but] win them, because they do not pay off on
place in a war.” Articles of War: Hearing on H. R. 2498 Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services,
81st Cong. 779 (1949). Concerning the role of military attorneys, Rep. Wiener warned the House
of Representatives by quoting General Sherman, stating “it will be a grave error if by negligence
we permit the military law to become emasculated by allowing lawyers to inject into it the
principles derived from their practice in the civil courts, which belong to a totally different system
of jurisdiction.” Id. at 780.
57. GENEROUS, supra note 19, at 51.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. HILLMAN, supra note 51, at 14.
62. GENEROUS, supra note 19, at 54.
63. Id.
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provided the President with the authority to “prescribe rules . . . [of]
procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before courts-martial.”64 To
guide the President, the UCMJ provided that he “shall, so far as he deems
practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district
courts.”65 The only congressional oversight the provision required was the
requirement that the President report the rules to Congress annually.66 By
establishing the authority to create the MCM and delegating it to the
President, Congress provided an additional means to bestow due process
rights upon accused service members. Similarly, the MCM provided a
means to increase the “civilianization” of the military justice system by
allowing the President to apply principles of law recognized in the federal
system.
C. MILITARY JUSTICE UNDER THE UCMJ AND MCM
The UCMJ attempted to balance due process and good order and
discipline by preserving the role of commander while also increasing due
process protections. Furthermore, the MCM attempted to establish a role
for the Executive branch in the military justice while also ensuring a
continued role for Congress. These balances, though, left a fair amount of
ambiguity, which in turn allowed other entities, such as the military courts
and Congress, to continue to increase the amount of due process afforded in
the military justice system.
1. The Increased Role of the Court of Military Appeals
While military justice was deployed in Korea, the military appellate
courts increased due process in the military justice system. Traditionally,
the military departments viewed due process as arising from Congress, not
the courts. The Court of Military Appeals (“CoMA”), though, found
differently. In a 1951 case, the court found that “Congress intended, in so
far as reasonably possible, to place military justice on the same plane as
civilian justice, and to free those accused by the military from certain vices
which infested the old system.”67 Based on this ruling, the court
determined that it was within the province of the CoMA to determine what
due process an accused service member was entitled to under the UCMJ

64. Id. at 55.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. United States v. Clay, 1 C.M.R. 74, 77 (C.M.A. 1951). See also GENEROUS, supra note
19, at 80-81; HILLMAN, supra note 51, at 25.
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and MCM. Specifically, the court “described the procedural protections
required at court-martial, including the right to be informed of the charges,
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to be represented by counsel, to
avoid self-incrimination, and to appeal a conviction.”68
This ruling recognized that due process rights for service members
arise from the UCMJ and MCM instead of the Constitution, and it is
significant because the court in effect warned “the services that if those
rights granted GI’s by Congress which parallel the Constitutional rights
enjoyed by civilians were violated by proper procedure at courts-martial,
CoMA would not consider such infringements harmless and would reverse
the convictions that followed.”69 Thus, service members now had an
avenue to not only define their due process rights, but to protect them as
well.
2. Reform During Vietnam
The military justice system faced unique circumstances in Vietnam. In
Vietnam, commanders faced a near breakdown in good order and
discipline; service members openly disobeyed orders, deserted, and
committed acts of misconduct, such as fragging, drug abuse, rape, and
murder.70 Commanders sought tools to effectively address this misconduct,
even at the cost of accused service members’ due process rights.71 In the
United States, though, the vocal opposition to the war led critics to argue
that the problem in Vietnam was not due process but rather not enough due
process.72 Hence, critics argued for further civilianization of the military
justice system with an increased role for attorneys and less authority for
commanders.73
The call for further reform resulted in the 1968 Military Justice Act.
The Act required that service members receive defense counsel for all
special courts-martial where a bad conduct discharge was possible and for
all other special courts-martial, unless deemed impractical because of
military service.74 Additionally, the Act created an independent trial
judiciary where active duty attorneys would serve as military judges. The
attorneys would have the authority to rule on pretrial motions as well as
68. HILLMAN, supra note 51, at 25.
69. GENEROUS, supra note 19, at 80.
70. WILLIAM T. ALLISON, MILITARY JUSTICE IN VIETNAM: THE RULE OF LAW IN AN
AMERICAN WAR 67-68 (2007).
71. Id. at 68.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. HILLMAN, supra note 51, at 27.
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issues of law and would serve under a separate chain of command from the
convening authority.75 Additionally, the accused service member now had
the right to request trial by military judge alone and to refuse a trial by
summary court-martial.76
D. THE CURRENT MILITARY JUSTICE TRINITY: THE BALANCE OF THE
MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM, DUE PROCESS, AND GOOD ORDER
AND DISCIPLINE
Upon passage of the 1968 Military Justice Act, today’s military justice
trinity was formed. Under the new Act, commanders, carrying the
responsibility to preserve good order and discipline within their units,
remained at the center of the military justice system. Simultaneously,
though, due process rights permeated the system, increased the role of
attorneys, and altered how commanders utilize military justice. Before
assessing the effectiveness of this trinity, however, a basic framework of the
current military justice system and the role played by due process is
necessary.
1. The Current Military Justice System
The role of the commander continues to define the current military
justice system. Because of this continued role, military law still struggles
with its inherent purpose. Is it to secure good order and discipline? Or, is it
to promote justice? The current system attempts to answer both
affirmatively.
a. The Purpose of Military Law
The current military justice system attempts to balance the need for
good order and discipline with due process and the interests of the military
justice. Specifically, the 2012 MCM provides the nature and purpose of
military law:
Military law consists of the statutes governing the military
establishment and regulations issued thereunder, the constitutional
powers of the President and regulations issued thereunder, and the
inherent authority of military commanders. Military law includes
jurisdiction exercised by courts-martial and the jurisdiction
exercised by commanders with respect to nonjudicial punishment.
The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in
75. Id.
76. Id.
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maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to
promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment,
and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United
States.77
Under this stated purpose, the current military justice trinity considers
the role of justice and good order and discipline as being equal,
noncompeting purposes that, when taken together, positively impact
national security. Inherent in this framework is the continued role of
military commanders.
b. Commander Driven System
Perhaps the most unique aspect of the military justice system is the
primacy of commanders. The military justice system is predicated upon the
“commander’s authority and discretion to control discipline within his or
her unit.”78 To ensure this authority, the military justice system involves
commanders at every part of the process, such as directing preliminary
investigations into misconduct, evaluating the results of investigations,
disposing of cases, preferral and referral of charges, selecting panel
members, and taking final action on both the court-martial’s adjudged
findings and sentence after the court-martial concludes.79
The commander’s most significant role in the military justice process is
that of convening authority. Courts-martial are not standing courts; instead,
they are convened when the need arises. Department secretaries establish
their department’s convening authorities, whom are seasoned and
established military officers who have extensive command authority.80
Generally, convening authorities involve themselves in cases only after
the preferral of charges.81 Upon receiving the evidence and charges, the
convening authority may dismiss the charges, refer the charges to a courtmartial, return the charges to the immediate commander for a lesser
disposition, forward the charges with his or her recommendations to a
higher convening authority, or direct further investigation to take place.82
Should the convening authority refer the case to trial, he or she then selects
the court members, who serve a role equivalent to that of a civilian jury.83
77. JOINT SERVICE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL I1 (2012) (emphasis added).
78. Roan & Buxton, supra note 17, at 192.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 196.
81. See RULES FOR COURT-MARTIAL 308(9) (2012) (hereinafter R.C.M.), 401(a).
82. See R.C.M. 401.
83. See R.C.M. 601.
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Prior to trial, the convening authority is responsible for responding to any
pretrial agreement offered by the accused service member, granting
immunity for military witnesses, paying for any expert witnesses or
consultants, and funding witness travel.84
After the court-martial, the case returns to the convening authority for
final action.85 The convening authority may grant clemency by suspending
or disapproving a portion of the accused service member’s sentence, but he
or she may not increase the sentence.86 Historically, the commander also
had the ability to set aside a finding of guilty.87 In the wake of recent cases,
however, Congress restricted that right, and now convening authorities are
prohibited from setting aside any felony offense where the adjudged
sentence is longer than six months or carries a discharge.88 Congress also
prohibited convening authorities from setting aside convictions for any
Convening
sexual offense, regardless of the adjudged sentence.89
authorities remain unable to impose a finding of guilty when the courtmartial returns a finding of not guilty.90
2. Due Process
Although not explicitly stated in the MCM’s purpose and nature of
military law, due process91 is a key component to the current military
justice trinity. Due process is the means by which justice impacts the
military justice system and good order and discipline. The current military
justice system affords accused service members due process rights
throughout the court-martial process. These rights fall into several different
categories: application of constitutional protections during pretrial
processing of cases, military discovery practices, appointment and role of
counsel, Article 32 hearings, use of military judges, trial procedures, and
the appellate review of court-martial convictions.92
84. See R.C.M. 703(d), 704(c), 705(d).
85. See R.C.M. 1107(a).
86. See R.C.M. 1108(b), 1109(9).
87. See 10 U.S.C. § 860(c)(3)(a) (1996); see also R.C.M. 1107(d)(1) (“The convening
authority may for any or no reason disapprove a legal sentence in whole or in part, mitigate the
sentence, and change a punishment to one of a different nature as long as the severity of the
punishment is not increased. The convening or higher authority may not increase the punishment
imposed by a court-martial.”).
88. National Defense Authorization Act § 860(c)(4)(A), 10 U.S.C. § 860(c)(4)(A) (2014).
89. Id.
90. 10 U.S.C. § 860(f)(2)(A) (2014).
91. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating “nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).
92. See Schleuter, supra note 18, at 63-71.
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a. Application of the Bill of Rights Protections During
Pretrial Processing
The UCMJ affords service members constitutional due process rights
during the pretrial investigation and processing of charges.93 Specifically,
the Fourth Amendment applies in military proceedings to any search and
seizure conducted pursuant to the investigation, whether conducted by
military or civilian authorities.94 Similarly, the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination applies to any interrogations of an accused
service member or to any request to produce incriminating information.95
Furthermore, an accused service member’s Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attaches immediately upon questioning.96
b. Military Discovery Practices
Military discovery rules arise from accused service members’ due
process rights.97 The UCMJ provides for a liberal discovery approach
specifically designed to be broader than in civilian federal criminal
proceedings “in an effort to eliminate pretrial gamesmanship.”98 The
discovery rights afforded to accused service members include the right to
compel the appearance of both military and civilian witnesses; the ability to
request, from the government, an expert consultant or witness to assist the
defense before trial and potentially testify during trial; and to have the
prosecution automatically disclose names and contact information of
prosecution witnesses, evidence that is favorable to the accused, evidence of
any prior convictions, evidence of statements made by the accused,
evidence seized from the accused, and evidence of any eyewitness
identifications.99 Often, the government pays for these services, especially
the witness travel expenses and expert consultant or witness fees.100
93. Id. at 63.
94. Id.
95. Id.; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL supra note 77, at III-3; MIL. R. EVID. 301; see also
Geoffrey S. Corn & Victor M. Hansen, Even if it Ain’t Broke, Why Not Fix It? Three Proposed
Improvements to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 J. NAT’L SECURITY L & POL’Y 447, 44849 (2013).
96. Schlueter, supra note 18, at 63-64.
97. Id. at 64 (citing Ronald S. Thompson, Constitutional Applications to the Military
Criminal Defendant, 66 U. DETROIT L. REV. 22 (1989)).
98. Elizabeth C. Hernandez & Jason M. Ferguson, The Brady Bunch: An Examination of
Disclosure Obligations in the Civilian Federal and Military Justice Systems, 67 A.F. L. REV. 187,
198 (2011) (finding that the military justice system provides for broader discovery than required
by practice in federal civilian trials) (citing United States v. Jackson, 59 M.J. 330, 333 (C.A.A.F.
2004); United States v. Santos, 59 M.J. 317, 321 (C.A.A.F. 2004)).
99. Schlueter, supra note 18, at 64-65.
100. Id. at 64.
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In addition to any exculpatory evidence, the military discovery rules
subject impeachment evidence to discovery.101 Impeachment evidence
“includes disclosure of evidence that may affect the credibility of a
government witness.”102 This information need not be admissible at trial
for it to be discoverable.103 Beyond the items required for discovery, the
military discovery rules require government counsel to actively seek out
potentially discoverable items and to do so in a timely manner.104
Prosecutors must exercise due diligence to discover information that is
material to the preparation of the defense, regardless of whether the defense
could have discovered the information on its own.105
c. Appointment and Role of Counsel
The UCMJ106 affords accused service members their Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.107 An accused service member is provided with a military
defense counsel free of cost.108 This attorney will represent the accused
service member immediately and throughout the pretrial and court-martial
process.109 Generally, the military defense counsel will be outside the
installation commander’s chain-of-command; this ensures the defense
attorney is able to freely represent his or her client without fearing reprisal
or adverse career implications.110
The accused service member’s
communications with the military defense counsel are also protected under
the attorney-client privilege.111 Accused service members also receive free
representation during the appellate process, although it is often a different
attorney than the one that represented them before or during the trial;
however, the new attorney often specializes in appellate practice.112

101. Hernandez & Ferguson, supra note 98, at 199.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 200.
105. Id.
106. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2012) (hereinafter UCMJ).
107. UCMJ art. 27; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
108. UCMJ art. 27; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL supra note 77, at A8-20; R.C.M.
501(b), 502, 506.
109. Schleuter, supra note 18, at 66.
110. Id.
111. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 77, at A21-17; MIL. R. EVID. 502(a).
112. See id. at II-162; R.C.M. 1202(b).
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d. Article 32 Hearings
The UCMJ provides any accused service member subject to a general
court-martial the right to an Article 32 hearing.113 The intent behind an
Article 32 hearing is threefold: “[to inquire] as to the truth of the matter set
forth in the charges, consideration of the form of the charges, and a
recommendation as to the disposition which should be made of the case in
the interest of justice and discipline.”114 Conducted prior to the referral
charges, an investigating officer, appointed by the convening authority, will
hear evidence, investigate the charges, and then provide a non-binding
recommendation to the convening authority as to the disposition of the
charges.115 The UCMJ does not provide a standard of proof for the
investigating officer’s recommendation. Instead, Rule for Court-Marital
405(j)(2)(H) provides that the investigating officer should base his or her
recommendation on “reasonable grounds to believe that the accused
committed the offense alleged.”116
The Article 32 hearing affords the accused substantial due process
rights. The accused has the right to be present for the investigation, to be
represented by counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, to object to irrelevant
or privileged evidence, to call witnesses and introduce evidence in his or
her defense and mitigation to all evidence presented by the government, and
to receive a copy of the investigating officer’s report, which is to include
the summary of all the testimony taken at the hearing.117 Additionally, the
recent National Defense Authorization provides that, when reasonably
available, a judge advocate should serve as the investigating officer.118 This
provision advances due process and, while the military branches differed in
their approach, non-attorney line officers were often used as investigating
officers.
e. Use of Military Judges
Although not required by the United States Supreme Court, the UCMJ
provides that accused service members have the right to a military judge to
preside over their special or general courts-martial.119 The role of military
judges is central to the due process rung of the trinity because it shifts the
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
801(a).

UCMJ art. 32; see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 77, at A22-58.
UCMJ art. 32(a).
R.C.M. 405(a).
R.C.M. 405(j)(2)(H).
See R.C.M. 405(f).
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, supra note 88, at § 1702.
UCMJ art. 26(a); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 77, at II-74; R.C.M.
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ability to mete out justice away from the commander and to a judge, who is
then entrusted with “ensuring that the rules of procedure and evidence are
applied and enforced.”120
f.

Trial Procedures

Due process dominates court-martial trial procedures. During courtsmartial, an accused service member is entitled to file motions to dismiss,
motions to suppress evidence, motions for appropriate relief, and motions
for continuances.121 Likewise, the military justice system affords accused
service members the right to select their trial forum, with enlisted service
members possessing the right to select trial by military judge alone, officer
members, or officer and enlisted members.122 Officer members may elect
trial by military judge alone or officer members.123 Accused service
members are also able to exert their trial-specific constitutional rights, such
as their Sixth Amendment right to confront any witness against them.124
This provision is especially evident in the military justice system as, based
upon the Confrontation Clause, the government cannot utilize video
teleconference (“VTC”) or other alternative means to secure remote witness
testimony over the accused service member’s objection.125
g. Appellate Review
The UCMJ requires that each military department establish a court of
criminal appeals.126 Accused service members may then appeal their courtmartial conviction to their department’s appellate court.127 Appellate
review is mandatory if the sentence includes death, a punitive discharge, or
confinement of one year or more.128 Upon complete of appellate review at
the department level, accused service members may then appeal an adverse
decision to the Court of Appeal for the Armed Forces (“CAAF”).129 The
United States Supreme Court may then review CAAF decisions.130 The
military justice system embeds, within the appellate process, several other
due process rights. Specifically, these courts have independent “fact120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Schlueter, supra note 18, at 66-67.
Id. at 68.
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 77, at A21-53.
Id. at II-69.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Id.
UCMJ art. 66(a).
Id.
UCMJ art. 66(b).
UCMJ art. 67.
UCMJ art. 67a; 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (2012).
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finding powers which provide a convicted servicemember with an
opportunity to argue that the conviction should be set aside because the
evidence was insufficient.”131 Similarly, the appellate courts can review the
sentence approved by the convening authority, including comparing it to
sentences adjudged in other cases.132 Lastly, the appellate courts may
remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on a specified issue.133
III. DUE PROCESS AND THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM—HOW
THE EXPANSION OF DUE PROCESS MARGINALIZED THE
COURT-MARTIAL WITHIN THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM
The increase in due process greatly altered the military justice trinity.
By strengthening the due process prong, Congress impacted the military
justice system prong. Specifically, the increase in due process resulted in
the court-martial process becoming costly and time-consuming. Seeking
expedited discipline, commanders turned away from the court-martial
process and opted for lesser but quicker means of punishment, especially
nonjudicial punishment and administrative discharges.
A. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALL THIS DUE PROCESS
The increase in due process rights afforded to service members had a
marked influence on military justice. Most dramatically, both the number
of courts-martial and the court-martial rates per thousand dramatically
decreased. In addition to courts-martial occurring less frequently, when
they did occur, they became drawn-out affairs, involving long processing
times and increasingly cumbersome procedures.
1. Courts-Martial Utilized With Much Less Frequency
The cumulative effect of the due process evolution was to marginalize
the court-martial as a tool for commanders to effectuate good order and
discipline. Figure 3.0 below reflects the court-martial rates per thousand,
beginning in 1913, for each military department. In 1913, under the
Articles of War, commanders often utilized courts-martial with 588 soldiers
and 239 sailors or Marines per thousand facing court-martial. Since then,
commanders have utilized courts-martial less frequently with the courtmartial rate gradually decreasing to the point where, in 2013, only 2.77

131. Schluester, supra note 18, at 70. See also UCMJ art. 66(c); MANUAL FOR COURTSMARTIAL, supra note 77, at II-171; R.C.M. 1203(b).
132. Schluester, supra note 18, at 71.
133. Id.
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rarely utilize the court-martial to preserve good order and discipline within
their units.
2. When Utilized, Today’s Courts-Martial Are a TimeConsuming and Cumbersome Process
Due process marginalized the court-martial as a capability for
commanders to effectuate good order and discipline because it rendered the
court-martial overly cumbersome and time-consuming.
Almost
immediately upon its passing in 1951, war in Korea tested the UCMJ.
Commanders utilized the court-martial in Korea to varying levels of
success, but found that the UCMJ hindered, more than assisted, in
preserving good order and discipline.139 In 1953, a congressional
committee consisting of military commanders, none of whom were
attorneys, concluded that “professional standards have been permitted to
deteriorate through lack of disciplinary control. The adoption of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, with its unwieldy legal procedure, has
made the effective administration of military discipline within the Armed
Forces more difficult.”140
Commanders in Vietnam expressed similar dissatisfaction with the
UCMJ.141 While they attempted to use the military justice system to deter
increased misconduct, the military justice system proved unresponsive.142
The due process rights afforded to service members—the right to an
attorney, a military judge, and an Article 32 investigation—“took a great
deal of time, and caseloads on the few military lawyers in Vietnam were
heavy.”143 Consequently, commanders often accepted favorable pretrial
agreements or dismissed charges to avoid the laborious court-martial
process.144 This apparent ineffectiveness of the military justice system to
ensure good order and discipline led some critics to wonder whether “due
process has become a fetish” creating a system that was “exceedingly
expensive, complicated and slow moving.”145
Recent statistics suggest that the courts-martial process continues to be
time consuming. Figure 3.1 depicts the processing times of Air Force

139. George S. Prugh, Observations on the UCMJ: 1954 and 2000, 165 MIL. L. REV. 21,
29-30 (2000).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 40.
142. Id. at 33-34.
143. ALLISON, supra note 70, at 69-70.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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courts-martial from 2010 to 2013.146 The Air Force initiates processing
times at the date the offense was discovered and terminates the processing
time when the convening authority takes final action.147 For all four years,
the processing times for general courts-martial averaged around 400
days.148 In contrast, processing times for special courts-martial fluctuated
between 159 and 210 days, while summary courts-martial ranged from 38
to 56 days.149 As such, when an airman engages in misconduct, the
commander faces the possibility that, should he or she proceed with a courtmartial, the misconduct may not be resolved for another 200 or 400 days.
To many commanders, the prospect of deferring resolution for 400 days
renders the court-martial an unrealistic option.

146. HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE, ARTICLE 6 PROCESSING TIMES REVIEW CALENDAR
YEAR 2012, at 2 (2012); HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE, ARTICLE 6 PROCESSING TIMES
REVIEW CALENDAR YEAR 2013, at 2 (2013).
147. HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE, 2012, supra note 146, at 2; HEADQUARTERS U.S.
AIR FORCE, 2013, supra note 146, at 2.
148. HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE, 2012, supra note 146, at 2; HEADQUARTERS U.S.
AIR FORCE, 2013, supra note 146, at 2.
149. HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE, 2012, supra note 146, at 2; HEADQUARTERS U.S.
AIR FORCE, 2013, supra note 146, at 2.
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Figure 3.1: USAF Courts-Martial Processing Times, Date of Discovery to
Final Action (days), 2010-2013
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B. THE RISE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS TO ACHIEVE GOOD ORDER
AND DISCIPLINE
The UCMJ affords commanders alternate means to address service
member misconduct. Nonjudicial punishment, which allows a commander
to impose fines, reduce enlisted members in rank, or impose additional
duties, allows a commander an expedient and, at times, visible form of
punishment. Meanwhile, administrative discharges, which effectively “kick
out” service members, allow a commander to quickly remove problematic
soldiers. In recent years, commanders have turned to these alternative
options with increasing frequency, apparently at the cost of courts-martial.
1. Nonjudicial Punishment
With the advent of increased due process rights, commanders turned
away from courts-martial and instead embraced nonjudicial punishment and
administrative discharges to address misconduct within their units. The
initial UCMJ afforded commanders the power to impose nonjudicial
punishment via Article 15, including the authority to impose confinement as
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punishment.150 The severe nature of the confinement option led to
commanders continuing to use the court-martial where more due process
rights were afforded, rather than nonjudicial punishment.151 In the early
1960s, however, the military departments advocated to reform Article 15,
mainly by removing commanders’ authority to impose confinement.152 As
such, in 1962, Congress lessened the punishment afforded under Article
15.153 In turn, commanders began to utilize nonjudicial punishment with
increased frequency, leading to a steep decline in courts-martial.154 Figure
3.2 represents the steep decline in Navy and Air Force court-martial rates
after commanders had the increased ability to impose nonjudicial
punishment.155
Figure 3.2: Court-Martial Rates per Thousand, 1963-1965
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In recent years, the relationship between nonjudicial punishment and
courts-martial rates appears to have stabilized. Figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5
represent the courts-martial rates per thousand compared to the nonjudicial
punishment rates per thousand for each department from 1979 to 2013.156
These figures are pertinent for several reasons. First, they indicate each
department experienced a dramatic decline in nonjudicial punishment rates
in the 1980s from which they have not recovered. Second, with the decline
in nonjudicial punishment rates per thousand, none of the departments
experienced a significant increase in courts-martial rates per thousand.
Taken together, these figures indicate that beginning in the 1980s,

150. GENEROUS, supra note 19, at 151.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. HILLMAN, supra note 51, at Table B.1.
156. The Annual Reports of the United States Court of Military Appeals provided the
courts-martial and nonjudicial punishment rates for 1979-2013.
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Figure 3.5: Air Force Courts-Martial and Nonjudicial Punishment Rates
per Thousand, 1979-2013
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2.

Administrative Discharges

There is strong evidence to suggest that commanders are increasingly
turning towards administrative discharges when faced with allegations of
misconduct. Commanders began turning away from courts-martial and
towards administrative discharges almost immediately upon the UCMJ’s
implementation. In 1958, the Air Force Judge Advocate General, Major
General Reginald Harmon, attributed the decrease in the Air Force’s courtsmartial rate to the fact that “many commanders are using the legally
authorized administrative discharge procedures instead of trial by courtmartial to take care of and get rid of offenders.”157 Commanders
throughout the service became “overwhelmed by what they regarded as
unreasonable complexities in court-martial law and practices” and as such,
“looked for simpler ways to handle their delinquency problems.”158
This trend continued into the 1970s as the Army Judge Advocate General
acknowledged that an increase in commanders electing to administratively
157. GENEROUS, supra note 19, at 131.
158. Id.
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discharge soldiers accused of misconduct was responsible for the decrease
in courts-martial rates.159 Within the military leadership at that time, the
commonly held viewpoint became “[a]dministrative separations could
eliminate servicemembers quickly and quietly.”160 Overall, between 1950
and 1973, corresponding to the development of the UCMJ and subsequent
due process reforms, “the percentage of undesirable discharges issued
through administrative, rather than court-martial, proceedings climbed
dramatically, from 64 percent in the early 1950s Army to 92 percent by the
early 1970s, and from 40 percent in the early 1950s Navy to 66 percent by
the early 1970s.”161
The preference for the speed and efficiency for administrative
discharges remains today. In its Annual Military Justice Report for fiscal
year 2013, the Marine Corps compared its total number of special courtsmartial against the total number of administrative discharge boards from
2007 to 2013.162 In fiscal year 2007, the Marine Corps conducted
approximately 800 special courts-martial and only 300 administrative
discharge boards.163 By fiscal year 2010, however, they performed
approximately the same amount of administrative discharge boards and
special courts-martial, around 600 of each.164 In fiscal year 2013, though,
they performed approximately 800 administrative discharge boards
compared to only 300 special courts-martial.165 This dramatic reversal of
fortunes reflects that commanders are increasingly selecting the more
expedient option of administrative discharge over the more costly and timeconsuming option of a court-martial.
In sum, since World War I, Congress gradually increased the amount
of due process afforded to accused service members. By increasing the
weight of the due process prong of the military justice trinity, Congress
greatly impacted the military justice system. The court-martial process,
once the primary tool of the commander to achieve good order and
discipline, became time-consuming and dominated by due process. As a
result, commanders utilized the court-martial with increasingly less
frequency and instead turned to less restrictive means to deal with instances

159. CODE COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS 15 (1976).
160. HILLMAN, supra note 51, at 20.
161. Id.
162. CODE COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS 98 (2013).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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of misconduct, specifically nonjudicial punishment and administrative
discharge.
IV. GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE WITHOUT THE COURTMARTIAL—HOW DUE PROCESS’S MARGINALIZING OF THE
COURT-MARTIAL PROCESS PREVENTS A COMMANDER
FROM PRESERVING GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE
What then is the impact of due process’s marginalization of the courtmartial process on good order and discipline? This section argues that the
court-martial is essential for commanders to effectuate good order and
disciple. To effectively preserve good order and discipline, commanders
must be able to use punishment to deter misconduct. It is the court-martial,
more so than nonjudicial punishment or administrative discharge, which
provides this capability to commanders. As such, without the court-martial,
commanders lose the ability to effectively preserve good order and
discipline.
The relationship between good order and discipline and the other two
prongs is of vital importance. It is through good order and discipline that
Congress and the military departments may find the root cause and solution
to the recent bouts of service member misconduct. To understand the role
and importance of good order and discipline, as well as its relationship to
the military justice system and due process, it is necessary to establish a
thorough understanding of what exactly good order and discipline is, why it
is important, who is responsible for it, and how it is achieved.
A. WHAT IS GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE?
Good order and discipline has long been an essential component of
military campaigns. Studying the jurist Quintis Sertorius’ successes against
the Roman army, Plutarch focused on Sertorius’ ability to bring good order
and discipline to the seemingly barbaric tribes of the Roman frontier.166
Plutarch noted that after the campaigns against Rome, Sertorius was “highly
honored for his introducing discipline and good order amongst them, for he
altered their furious, savage manner of fighting . . . out of a confused
number of thieves and robbers he constituted a regular, well-disciplined
army.”167 In modern times, the primacy of good order and discipline to
achieve military objectives remains. Operation Enduring Freedom veterans
regularly comment on the capability of Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
166. PLUTARCH, THE LIVES OF THE NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS 687 (Arthur Hugh
Clough ed., John Drydon trans., Random House 2d ed. 1992).
167. Id.
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Although they expected disorganized and undisciplined fighters, these
veterans instead faced a highly organized and structured force with Taliban
commanders exercising good order and discipline to achieve military
objectives.168
Despite the accepted norm that good order and discipline is important,
the actual definition of the term is murky at best. Part of the problem is that
attorneys—both civilian and military—manage the relationship between
good order and discipline and the military justice system, as opposed to
military commanders. Attorneys tend to follow the Supreme Court and
accept that war is a separate sphere best left to combat professionals, and
good order and discipline falls within that sphere.169 These scholars tend to
acknowledge that good order and discipline is important and then move
onto the more legally-centered military justice system.
In addition, military doctrine does not directly define good order and
discipline. Joint Publication 1, the doctrine behind the joint force,
establishes who is responsible for discipline in the joint environment, but
fails to define it.170 Army and Air Force leadership doctrines discuss the
need for leaders to exercise self-discipline and intra-unit discipline, but both
focus on how to achieve discipline, as opposed to what it is.171
Attempts to define the term in the past have focused more on the
discipline portion than the good order portion. For example, a 1960
commission consisting of high-ranking officers defined good order and
discipline as “a state of mind which leads to a willingness to obey an order
no matter how unpleasant or dangerous the task to be performed . . . .”172 A
more thorough definition is utilized by the Air Force in its annual Air Force
Officer’s Guide. There, the Air Force defines good order and discipline as:
Military discipline is intelligent, willing, and positive
obedience to the will of the leader. Its basis rests upon the
voluntary subordination of the individual to the welfare of
the group. It is the cohesive force that binds the members
of a unit, and its strict enforcement is a benefit for all. Its
constraint must be felt not so much in the fear of
168. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 9.
169. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302 (1983) (“[i]t is difficult to conceive of an
area of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and
professional decisions as to the . . . control of a military force are essentially professional military
judgments . . . .”).
170. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 1, DOCTRINE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE U.S. IV-18 (2013).
171. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY AR600-100 (2007).
172. Schlueter, supra note 18, at 27 (quoting AD HOC COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE UNIFORM
CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE HON. WILLIAM R. BRUCKER, SECRETARY OF THE
ARMY 11-12 (1960)).
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punishment as in the moral obligation it imposes on the
individual to heed the common interests of the group.
Discipline establishes a state of mind that produces proper
action and prompt cooperation under all circumstances,
regardless of obstacles. It creates in the individual a desire
and determination to undertake and accomplish any
mission assigned by the leader.173
This definition has proven to be enduring; it appears unchanged in
thirty-five editions, encompassing most of the Air Force’s existence. It is
also thorough and addresses obedience to military leaders, the primacy of
such obedience to mission readiness, and also the need for unit cohesion,
which speaks to the good order portion of good order and discipline. As
such, this definition shall provide the basis for the understanding of good
order and discipline in the following discussions.
B. WHY DOES GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE MATTER?
While addressing why good order and discipline matters, it is easy to
rely solely on the argument that good order and discipline enables
successful military operations. The answer is more nuanced, however. In
combat, the military requires service members to do three things often
against human nature: put oneself at risk to be killed, to kill, and, at times,
not kill when threatened.174 Additionally, both before and during combat,
the military mandates that service members subordinate personal interests
in favor of the group to foster unit cohesion. Made possible through good
order and discipline, these elements help ensure mission success.
1. The Need to Place Service Members at Risk
American history is peppered with instances of commanders ordering
service members to put themselves at near risk of death. Whether storming
Bunker Hill, Pickett’s Hill, the beaches of Normandy, or the urban
landscape of Fallujah, service members have faced an overwhelming risk of
death to achieve military objectives.175 At times, the risk presented even
guaranteed death. During the combined bomber offensive in World War II,
the Army Air Corps suffered dramatic losses. Army statisticians used 8th
Air Force’s loss rates and the number of flights required to return home to
calculate that Army Air Corps’ pilots faced a one hundred percent certainty

173. JEFFREY C. BENTON, AIR FORCE OFFICER’S GUIDE 41 (Stackpole Books, 35th ed.
2005).
174. Theurer & Russell, supra note 15, at 8.
175. Id.
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of death during the course of the war.176 Despite these daunting odds,
service members continue to engage in these operations. It is good order
and discipline, with its emphasis on creating a state of mind within service
members to follow the will of their commanders, which enables
commanders to order their service members at risk to achieve mission
objectives and to have their service members follow the orders.
2. The Need to Have Service Members Kill
The harsh reality of war is that commanders must ask their service
members to kill to achieve mission success.177 Commanders cannot assume
obedience from their service members when it comes to killing. Studies
reflect that service members are often reluctant to actually engage the
enemy once in contact.178 For example, during World War II, only fifteen
to twenty percent of combat infantry were willing to fire their rifles.179 This
reluctance relates to the idea that “within each person a force that
understands at some gut level that all humanity is inextricably
interdependent and that to harm any part is to harm the whole . . . .”180
Marcus Aurelius contemplated this inner belief in his command of the
Roman Army, positing “every individual dispensation is one of the causes
of the prosperity, success, and even survival of that which administers the
universe. To break of any particle, no matter how small, from the
continuous concatenation—whether of cause or of any other elements—is
to injure the whole.”181 In combat, though, commanders must rely upon
good order and discipline to break their service members of this mindset
and instead develop the willingness to kill when ordered to do so.
3. The Need to Have Service Members Not Kill
Today’s military is not limited to conventional warfare. The joint force
is organized “across a range that extends from military engagement,
security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited
contingency operations and, if necessary, to major operations.”182 Within
this range of military operations fall several operations, such as civil
176. MARK CLODFELTER, BENEFICIAL BOMBING: THE PROGRESSIVE FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN AIR POWER, 1917-1945 104 (2010).
177. Theurer & Russell, supra note 15, at 8.
178. DAVE GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING TO KILL IN
WAR AND SOCIETY 144 (2009).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 37-38.
181. Id. at 38.
182. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3, DOCTRINE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE U.S. xvii (2011).
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support, foreign humanitarian assistance, and counterinsurgency (“COIN”),
where the use of lethal force will impede and damage the mission.183
Restraint, though, may be easier said than done. COIN speaks to the
inherent difficulty of exercising restraint in a kinetic environment.
Commanders leading COIN operations utilize their service members to win
the hearts and minds of the local population.184 They do so with the
understanding that by killing one innocent civilian, a service member may
create five insurgents.185 To the service member conducting COIN,
however, he or she must be “ready to be greeted with either handshake or a
hand grenade while taking on missions.”186 When operating in a combat
environment, it is natural for a service member to utilize lethal force when
threatened. In COIN, however, the service member must show restraint
when threatened because, if the grenade is actually a handshake, the effect
of killing may have dire strategic consequences.187 As such, it falls upon
the commander to instill within his or her service members the restraint
necessary to not kill when the mission requires.
4. Unit Cohesion
Unit cohesion is essential for military operations. It is unit cohesion
that allows for a group of disparate service members to subject their
personal fears and desires to the collective well-being and the success of the
fighting force. Research indicates that “the primary factor that motivates a
soldier to do the things that no sane man wants to do in combat (that is,
killing and dying) is not the force of self-preservation but a powerful sense
of accountability to his comrades in the battlefield.”188 The importance of
unit cohesion extends from the battlefield to the home station. In garrison,
unit cohesion speaks to the readiness of the unit and the ties that bind them
as a potential fighting force. A breakdown in unit cohesion in garrison is
likely to lead to a further breakdown in combat, resulting in potentially
tragic results. Inherent in the definition of good order and discipline is the
principle’s ability to serve as the “cohesive force that binds the members of
a unit.”189

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
GROSSMAN, supra note 178, at 149 (explanatory parenthetical contained in original).
BENTON, supra note 173, at 41.
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C. WHO BEARS THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR GOOD ORDER AND
DISCIPLINE?
In the debate about the continued role of commanders in the military
justice system, there is one consistent point of agreement between critics
and advocates—commanders are responsible for good order and discipline
within their units. Commanders bear the responsibility of the welfare,
morale, mission readiness, and safety of their service members, and, in
combat, direct actions of service members that may result in their death.
Consequently, the responsibility for good order and discipline can only fall
upon the commander. But what commander?
In today’s increasingly bureaucratic and integrated military, service
members have several different commanders. Service members serve under
their immediate commander, but they are often under at least three superior
commanders. As the level of command grows, the more likely it is that the
superior commander will be geographically separated from the service
member.190 The identification of the commander becomes even more
difficult if the service member deploys. While deployed, a service member
may serve under a joint commander, a service commander, and under the
command of the service member’s home station.191 The multiple layers of
command make it difficult to assess which of these commanders is
ultimately responsible for good order and discipline.
Studies reflect that military service places the immediate commander
in the best position to bear the responsibility for good order and discipline.
Proximity is the key. A World War II study examined instances where
American soldiers engaged enemy forces with fire and incidents when they
did not.192 The study found that “almost all soldiers would fire their
weapons while their leaders observed and encouraged them in a combat
situation.”193 In comparison, when the commander left, “the firing rate

190. For example, an airman assigned to Moody Air Force Base in Valdosta, Georgia, most
likely has a squadron commander, a group commander, and a wing commander, all co-located
with him or her at the installation. The airman then falls under a Numbered Air Force
Commander at Shaw Air Force Base in Sumter, South Carolina and also under Major Command
Commander located at Joint Base Langley in Hampton Roads, Virginia. Most likely, the airman
has little, if any, interaction with his or her wing commander, let alone the higher-level
commanders located in different states.
191. For example, in the deployed environment, he or she may fill a joint tasking as an
individual augmentee. There, he or she may work for a non-Air Force military commander, but
also be under the command of an Air Force expeditionary wing commander located somewhere in
theater. Beyond the expeditionary wing commander, the airman falls under the command of the
Air Forces Central Command commander, located at Shaw Air Force Base.
192. GROSSMAN, supra note 178, at 144.
193. Id.
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immediately dropped to 15 to 20 percent.”194 Similarly, in 2013, a number
of commanders testified before the Department of Defense’s Defense Legal
Policy Board concerning their experiences commanding in Iraq and
Afghanistan.195 Each commander testified that they bore the ultimate and
immediate responsibility of good order and discipline for each of the
service members under their joint command, even if an individual service
member fell under the command of several other levels of service-specific
command.196 As one Army commander noted:
I was there. I saw these troops every day. I made sure
they had food to eat, toilet paper to wipe themselves, and a
place to sleep. I was the one that was going to ask them to
kill and I was the one going to ask them to die. An Airman,
Sailor, or Marine may have answered to a different
commander somewhere, but when he was in my
battlespace, he was my responsibility.197
D. HOW DO COMMANDERS ACHIEVE GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE?
Good order and discipline presents a daunting task for commanders. A
commander needs to instill into his or her service members’ mindset a sense
of uncompromising obedience and duty. This mindset must then lead to
service members putting themselves at grave risk—to kill or not to kill—all
at the order of their commander. How does the commander make the
seemingly impossible possible? What tools does he or she need to make
this mindset a reality? The answer lies in both positive and negative means,
the negative means linking the good order and discipline prong of the trinity
to the military justice prong.
1. Positive Means
Positive rewards and reinforcement enable a commander to achieve
good order and discipline by ascribing a sense of loyalty and affection
amongst his or her service members.198 While describing Sertorius’ ability
to achieve good order and discipline within his troops, Plutarch did not
mention discipline or fear. Instead, he noted Sertorius:
bestowed silver and gold upon them liberally to gild and
adorn their helmets, he had their shields worked with
various figures and designs, he brought them into the mode
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
See generally REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 2.
Id.
Id. at 231 (quoting Brigadier General Gary Volesky).
GROSSMAN, supra note 178, at 145.
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of wearing flowered and embroidered cloaks and coats, and
by supplying money for these purposes, and joining with
them in all improvements, he won the hearts of all.199
Sertorius recognized that to obtain the uncontested obedience of his
disparate troops, they would have to feel ties of affection and loyalty to
him; otherwise, they would not willingly submit to his command. Recent
studies confirm that bonds of loyalty are essential to commanders
exercising good order and discipline.200 A 1973 study demonstrated that
“the primary factor in ensuring the will to fight is identification with the
direct commanding officer.”201 In this study, respected and established
commanders were able to gain compliance from soldiers in combat much
more effectively than unknown or disrespected leaders.202
While
commanders today cannot provide their service members with gold or
money, they can provide positive rewards and reinforcement through a
variety of means, including: awards, decorations, promotions, positive
performance reviews, and morale activities.
2. Negative Means
Commanders cannot rely on positive reinforcement alone to effectuate
good order and discipline. To ensure good order and discipline within their
units, commanders must be able to hold service members accountable for
acts of misconduct.203 Commanders do so via the ability to impose
punishment.204 Beyond accountability, one of the primary purposes of
punishment is deterrence, both specific and general. By punishing service
members for misconduct that strikes at good order and discipline,
commanders are not only able to deter the offending service member from
again committing misconduct, but are also able to deter the other members
of the unit from committing misconduct.
It is here that good order and discipline and the military justice system
meet. The UCMJ serves as the “primary tool for administering legal
consequences for breaches of discipline.”205
Under the UCMJ,
commanders possess a range of punishment options ranging from the
administrative to the nonjudicial to the court-martial. Through this ability,

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

PLUTARCH, supra note 166, at 687.
GROSSMAN, supra note 178, at 145.
Id. at 144.
Id.
Theurer & Russell, supra note 15, at 9.
Id.
Id.
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commanders are supposed to be able to deter misconduct, thereby ensuring
good order and discipline within their units.
E. HOW EFFECTIVE IS THE CURRENT MILITARY JUSTICE TRINITY IN
ACHIEVING GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE?
Commanders increasingly utilize nonjudicial punishment and
administrative discharge tools to address service member misconduct.
Consequently, the question then turns to how well do these lesser forms of
punishment, as compared to the more severe option of the court-martial,
deter service member misconduct.
Criminology provides a basic
framework to understand what factors best deter crime. This framework
can be applied to service member misconduct and proves helpful in
determining what means of punishment—the court-martial, nonjudicial
punishment, or administrative discharge—best deters service member
misconduct.
1. Deterrence Theory: How Best to Deter Misconduct
Deterrence theory identifies several factors that deter crime: credibility of
punishment, severity of punishment, celerity of punishment, and collateral
effects of punishment.206 Of these factors, studies reflect that the credibility
of punishment—the belief that if an individual engages in crime, he or she
will be caught and punished—best deters crime.207 The more an individual
believes that he or she will be caught, the less likely he or she is to commit
the offense.208 Closely related to credibility of punishment is the severity of
the punishment. On its own, severity of punishment has little correlation to
deterrence.209 A rational actor is unlikely to be deterred by the severity of
the punishment if he or she does not believe there is a credible chance that
he or she will be caught and punished.210 If, however, there is a high degree
of credibility, the severity of punishment correlates to deterrence.211 The
likelihood of individuals engaging in a crime if they believe they will be
caught further decreases as the level of severity in punishment increases.212

206. See generally Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and
Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39
CRIMINOLOGY 865 (2001).
207. Id. at 870.
208. Id. at 880.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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Concerning celerity, classical deterrence theory posited that for
punishment to have a deterrent effect, it must be swift and immediately
proceed the misconduct.213 While recent studies reflect a minimal
correlation between the celerity of a punishment and deterrence, it appears
too soon to discount the deterrent effect of celerity. 214 Criminologists
suggest that celerity may still play an important role in deterrence and
warrants further research and studies.215
Recent studies also indicate that the collateral effects of punishment
may have a deterrent effect.216 For example, in a study examining the
deterrence effects of a driving under the influence (“DUI”) conviction,
researchers indicated that the “extra-legal” consequences of a DUI
conviction, including the shame of a conviction, the inability to drive, and
the future recognition that they were convicted of a DUI, deterred DUI
offenses with as much correlation as the legal sanctions of confinement and
fines.217 Overall, deterrence theory establishes that a high credibility of
punishment, coupled with severity, best deters crime and that collateral
effects and celerity of punishment also contribute to deterring misconduct.
2. Deterrence Theory Applied to the Current Military Justice
Trinity
When applying this framework to the current military justice trinity, it
becomes evident that none of the current forms of punishment effectively
deter service member misconduct. In its current state, the court-martial
process cannot deter misconduct. To be deterred, a service member must
find the risk of being caught and punished to be credible. With a courtmartial rate averaging around two service members per thousand218, the
court-martial process does not support a credible belief that service
members will be caught and punished. A service member is unlikely to
know someone who has been subject to court-martial, hear of a service
member facing a court-martial for similar misconduct, or be exposed to the
consequences of a court-martial. Thus, with a marginalized court-martial
process, service members do not find the risk of punishment to be credible.
Similarly, celerity in the court-martial process is lacking. Courtsmartial, especially general courts-martial, take a long time from the

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 885.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 881-82.
Id. at 882.
See generally CODE COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 159.
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discovery of the offense to final action.219 Hence, a service member is
likely to change assignments, deploy, or separate prior to the completion of
a court-martial action, reducing further the deterrent effect of the current
court-martial process. While courts-martial continue to provide for severe
punishments and collateral consequences, the lack of credibility and celerity
provided by the court-martial process undermines the deterrent value of the
present day court-martial system.
Likewise, nonjudicial punishment and administrative discharges
provide little deterrent effect to service member misconduct. Admittedly,
the frequency of nonjudicial punishment and the ever-increasing frequency
of administrative discharges may enhance the credibility of punishment. As
more service members receive nonjudicial punishment or are
administratively discharged for instances of misconduct, other service
members are likely to find it more credible that they will be caught and
punished for similar misconduct. However, the non-public nature of
nonjudicial punishment and administrative discharges undercuts the
credibility that these punishments provide. Unlike a court-martial,
nonjudicial proceedings are private.220 While other service members may
be aware that a service member received nonjudicial punishment and the
offending service members may publically display such punishment
through a visible reduction in rank, the underlying offense is not necessarily
publicized or apparent. Similarly, while an administrative discharge board
may be public, administrative discharges are often handled absent a public
hearing.221 While an individual’s separation is apparent, the basis for the
separation may not be.
Even if nonjudicial punishment and administrative discharges provide
a certain amount of credibility, the lack of severity regarding these
punishments further undermines their deterrent effectiveness. Nonjudicial
punishment does not allow for confinement or separation, either
administratively or punitively.222 As such, the most a commander can do is
fine an accused, provide additional duties, reprimand, restrict an individual
to base, or reduce a service member in rank.223 The options lessen when the

219. See HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE, 2012, supra note 146, at 2; see also
HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE, 2013, supra note 146, at 2.
220. See UCMJ art. 15.
221. See generally John Brooker et.al., Beyond ‘T.B.D.”: Understanding VA’s Evaluation of
a Former Services Member’s Benefit Eligibility Following Involuntary or Punitive Discharge
from the Armed Forces, 214 MIL. L. REV. 1, 128 (2012).
222. UCMJ art. 15.
223. Id.
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accused service member is an officer and the commander loses the ability to
reduce the officer in rank.224
Concerning administrative discharges, separation from the military
may not even be a punishment to many accused service members. With
service commitments and the prospects of deploying to a combat zone,
many service members may welcome the opportunity to separate early,
regardless of their service characterization.225 For those service members
who do not desire an early separation, administrative discharges fail to
provide severe punishment. While a service member will be effectively
“fired,” the lasting effects are minimal. The commander may separate the
service member with an honorable, general, or under other than honorable
Both a general and UOTHC
conditions (“UOTHC”) discharge.226
discharge characterization prevents the service member from enjoying the
full benefits of previous military service, but neither of these
characterizations involve confinement or the negative legal and social
stigmas of a bad conduct or dishonorable discharge.227 Overall, the lack of
confinement or punitive discharge options prevents nonjudicial punishment
or administrative discharges from providing effective deterrence of service
member misconduct.
A court-martial, though, used frequently and with celerity, provides
the most effective deterrence for a commander. If commanders utilize a
court-martial with increased frequency, service members will begin to
believe that if they engage in misconduct, they will not only be caught, but
will also be punished. Similarly, the severity of punishment afforded by the
court-martial, including substantial confinement and punitive discharges,
will increase deterrence when coupled with the increased level of credibility
of punishment.228 Furthermore, the court-martial carries with it several
collateral effects. Convicted service members will in most cases be
convicted felons and lose federal rights accordingly.229 They will carry
with them the shame of a federal conviction and the possibility of a punitive
discharge, which will limit future employment options.230 Therefore, to
achieve the appropriate level of deterrence to ensure good order and
discipline, commanders need a frequent and efficient court-martial process.

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
See Theurer & Russell, supra note 15, at 10.
Brooker et al., supra note 221, at 135.
Id.
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 77, at II-126.
Brooker et al., supra note 221, at 152-53.
Id.
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The need for a fully realized court-martial process, however, should
not blind commanders. Underlying the need to use punishment for good
order and discipline is the requirement that service members view this
punishment as legitimate.231 Here lies the continued role for due process in
the military justice trinity. While the increase in due process may have
rendered the court-martial process an ineffective tool for commanders to
deter service member misconduct, due process also provides a sense of
fairness and legitimacy to the court-martial process. Thus, commanders
cannot neglect due process when relying upon the court-martial process to
preserve good order and discipline.
In sum, commanders can only preserve good order and discipline
within their units if they have the ability to deter misconduct through
punishment.
According to deterrence theory, commanders need
punishment that is credible, severe, swift, and possesses collateral
consequences to effectively deter misconduct.
Additionally, the
punishment imposed must be viewed as legitimate and just in order to have
a deterrent effect. The current military justice trinity fails in its
responsibility to provide that deterrent effect.
While the due process prong provides legitimacy and fairness, it
renders the court-martial a marginalized tool. Consequently, the current
court-martial process is not credible.
The alternative means of
punishment—nonjudicial punishment and administrative discharges—
provide some credibility, but lack the severity and collateral effects of a
court-martial, thereby minimizing their deterrence. It is the fully-realized
court-martial process, with its allotment of severe punishment and collateral
effects, when used with frequency and celerity, that best provides the
commander with the capacity to deter through punishment.
V. RESTORING THE TRINITY—RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
REFORM
The current military justice trinity is not properly balanced. Congress,
the military appellate courts, and the military departments expanded due
process at the cost of the military justice system. By rendering the courtmartial process an overly cumbersome and time-consuming process, the
expansion of due process restricted commanders’ ability to effectuate good
order and discipline—the results of which are apparent in the recent highprofile bouts of misconduct throughout the military departments. The
231. Theurer & Russell, supra note 15, at 9 (citing Kenneth Butterfield, et al.
Organizational Punishment from the Manager’s Perspective: An Explanatory Study, J. OF
MANAGERIAL ISSUES (2005)).
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question then turns to how should Congress and the military departments
balance the military justice trinity.
The Articles of War represent the ultimate emphasis on good order and
discipline. Absent much due process, the Articles of War allowed a
commander to quickly and directly utilize the court-martial process to
effectuate good order and discipline. Nonetheless, as evidenced by the calls
for reform in World War I and World War II, the confluence of good order
and discipline and the military justice system, at the expense of due process,
was not the proper balance. Discipline must be legitimate; without due
process the rampant use of court-martials was de-legitimized.
Additionally, a return to the limited-to-none due process model would
not be a realistic option today. The fact that Congress, the military
appellate courts, and the military departments have provided due process
rights to accused service members creates a Flowers for Algernon type
situation should Congress seek to take much of those rights away.232
Service members and the public are accustomed to accused service
members having basic constitutional rights, such as the right to an attorney,
military judge, a trial by jury, and a review of their case. Congress and the
military departments would face much criticism for removing these rights,
which, in turn, could negatively impact morale within the services and
challenge the legitimacy of the military justice process.
With the current and historical balances insufficient, Congress and the
military departments should seize this opportunity to strike the proper
balance. The key to finding the right balance is the appropriate level of due
process. While recognizing that due process plays an essential role in the
military justice trinity, Congress and the military departments should limit
the extra-constitutional due process rights afforded to accused service
members.233 By scaling back accused service members’ extra due process
232. See generally DANIEL KEYES, FLOWERS FOR ALGERNON (2005). In Flowers for
Algernon, Charlie Gordon, a middle-aged man with a remarkably low IQ, was the subject of a
medical experiment where researchers were able to make him a genius. A happy individual
before the procedure, Charlie became increasingly angry and unhappy with the higher IQ.
Eventually, the treatment failed and Charlie resorted to his original IQ. However, he recalled life
with the higher IQ and was extremely unhappy because of this experience, eventually giving up
on life.
233. See James M. Hirschhorn. The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and
Servicemen’s Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C. L. REV. 177, 178 (1984) (“[A] stable majority of the
[Supreme] Court has accepted the proposition that the armed forces are a ‘separate community’ in
which greater than usual restrictions on individual liberty are required. In practice, the Court has
given considerable, though not clearly delineated, deference to decisions by Congress or the
military authorities that restrict the political expression, access to political activity, and right to
counsel of servicemen and that impose gender-based restrictions on military career prospects.”).
Under this line of reasoning, Congress and the military departments can scale back the due
process rights afforded to accused service members with the extent of that de-escalation
established by policy, not by law.
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rights and restoring the viability of the court-martial as a tool for good order
and discipline, Congress and the military departments will strengthen the
military justice system prong. In turn, the good order and discipline prong
will grow in strength and commanders will have the capability to deter
serious misconduct.
To achieve these ends, the military departments and Congress can
begin by identifying extra-constitutional rights throughout the court-martial
process and then scaling back those rights. Beyond reducing specific due
process rights, the military departments should develop a culture where the
goal of military law is good order and discipline. But before implementing
any reform, including increases and decreases in due process, the direct and
indirect effects on good order and discipline should be weighed.
A. LIMITING ACCUSED SERVICE MEMBERS’ DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
The military justice trinity is a delicate balance. Due process is
especially delicate; a haphazard or piecemeal approach may not only fail to
revitalize the court-martial as an effective tool for discipline, but may also
delegitimize the entire process. As such, the military departments should
assess due process at the structural, pretrial, trial, and post-trial levels.
1. Structural Reform—Eliminate the Distinction Between Special
and General Courts-Martial
The distinction between a special and general courts-martial provides
increased due process rights to an accused service member. A general
court-martial, conducted in instances of serious misconduct, includes
multiple levels of review.234 Upon preferral of charges, the special courtmartial convening authority reviews the charges and then forwards the
charges, along with a recommendation, to the general court-martial
convening authority—a superior commander.235 The general court-martial
convening authority then determines whether to refer the charges to a
general court-martial.236 The two levels of review, and the ultimate
decision of referral resting with a superior commander, provides additional
process for accused service members to ensure their rights are not being
violated.
These additional layers of review also prolong the process. As Figure
3.1237 portrays, between 2010 and 2013 general courts-martial averaged
234.
235.
236.
237.

UCMJ arts. 66-67a; R.C.M. 1201-1210.
R.C.M. 404
R.C.M. 601
See supra Part III.A.2.
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about 200 more days to process than special courts-martial.238 While the
time disparity partly relates to the increased complexity of offenses referred
to general courts-martial as compared to special courts-martial, which
causes general courts-martial to require more investigative time between the
date of discovery and preferral, the additional layers of review also add time
to the process. Furthermore, resting the referral authority for a general
court-martial with the superior commander distances the immediate
commander from the court-martial process.
While the immediate
commander may prefer charges, the ultimate decision whether to refer the
case to trial resides at least two levels above the immediate commander.
Consequently, when electing disciplinary action, the immediate commander
may be hesitant to elect a court-martial because he or she knows the case
will be resolved well above his or her level.
As such, Congress and the military departments should eliminate the
distinction between special and general courts-martial. Instead, an
immediate commander should be responsible for the preferral of charges
against his or her service members. The decision to refer should then reside
with the current special court-martial convening authority, who is often colocated with the immediate commander and more directly involved with the
day-to-day operations and discipline of the installation.
Removing the additional layer of review will not only decrease
processing times, but it will give the immediate commander and his or her
directly superior commander greater responsibility and ownership over their
cases. To prevent misuse of this authority, the special court-martial
convening authority’s staff judge advocate should have the discretion to
recommend that the special court-martial convening authority’s immediate
commander—the current general court-martial convening authority—
review the case. This recommendation should only occur when the special
court-martial convening authority refuses to refer charges, and, in the judge
advocate’s opinion, the facts of the case warrant trial by court-martial.
Overall, by streamlining the court-martial process, cases will proceed to
trial more quickly and lower-level commanders will be more invested in
their cases, which, in turn, may increase their willingness to utilize the
court-martial process to effectuate good order and discipline.
2. Pretrial Reforms
During the pretrial process, accused service members receive extraconstitutional due process rights in the form of Article 32 investigations and
238. HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE, 2012, supra note 146, at 2; HEADQUARTERS U.S.
AIR FORCE, 2013, supra note 146, at 2.
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an abundance of discovery rights. While these additional due process rights
were intended to provide protections to accused service members and serve
as a check on commanders, they make courts-martials increasingly
laborious and time consuming. The military departments should address
these issues by modeling Article 32 investigations and discovery rights on
their federal practice counterparts.
a. Eliminate Article 32 Hearings in Favor of a Grand Jury
System
Currently, accused service members have a right to an Article 32
hearing when the special court-martial convening authority recommends to
the general court-martial convening authority that preferred charges should
be referred to a general court-martial.239 Initially, Article 32 hearings had a
limited purpose: mainly “to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in
the charges, the form of the charges, and to secure information on which to
determine what disposition should be made of the case.”240 In practice,
though, Article 32 hearings have developed into “mini-trials.” Because of
the additional rights provided to accused service members in Article 32
hearings, specifically, “the rights to counsel, cross-examination, and
presentation of evidence,”241 the government must invest substantial time
and resources in preparing for the Article 32 hearing, which includes
witness travel and complying with defense discovery requests.
As a result, Article 32 hearings are time consuming. For example, in
2012, the Air Force averaged thirty-five days from preferral of charges to
the Article 32 hearing.242 The Air Force then averaged twenty-four days
from the completion of the Article 32 hearing to referral of charges, thereby
averaging fifty-nine days from preferral of charges to referral of charges.243
In comparison, in 2012, the Air Force averaged nine days between preferral
and referral of charges in special courts-martial where accused service
members were not afforded the right to an Article 32 hearing.244
Similarly, in 2013, the Air Force averaged forty-one days from
preferral to the Article 32 hearing and twenty-two days between the Article
32 hearing and referral of charges, for a total of sixty-three days between
preferral and referral.245 Meanwhile, that same year, the Air Force
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

UCMJ art. 32; R.C.M. 405.
R.C.M. 405(a) (discussion).
R.C.M. 405(b).
HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE, 2012, supra note 146, at 5.
Id.
Id. at 8.
HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE, 2013, supra note 146, at 5.
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averaged twelve days from preferral to referral of charges in specials
courts-martial.246
To increase the expediency of the court-martial process, Congress and
the military departments should eliminate the Article 32 hearing process
and instead adopt a system closely related to the federal grand jury process.
Within the federal system, the government must secure a grand jury
indictment of an accused before the case can proceed to trial.247 The federal
system affords the accused very little rights within the grand jury system.
For example, the accused does not have a right to be present, to be
represented by counsel, to confront witnesses, or even to be aware of the
proceedings. In addition, there is no judge present, the prosecutor is not
bound by any rules of evidence and may introduce improperly seized
evidence, and the proceedings are performed in secret, with the accused not
permitted to receive a transcript of the proceedings.248 The government
also possesses the light standard of probable cause to secure an
indictment249
Such a system can be applied to the military justice system. Upon the
preferral of charges, a convening authority may convene a grand jury-like
board before which the designated trial counsel can present the
government’s case and not be bound by the rules of evidence or subject to
the presence of the accused service member. The designated grand jury
board can then determine whether the government meets its probable cause
standard and provide a recommendation to the convening authority.
Unlike in the federal system, the recommendation should not be
binding, as the convening authority is ultimately responsible for military
discipline. However, the process ensures that the government possesses
probable cause to proceed further with the case. The end result of the
process is that the government would be able to proceed more quickly
between the preferral of charges and referral of charges without perfecting
its case in anticipation of the Article 32 hearing while also ensuring that
there remains some check on the government’s ability to bring charges to
trial.

246.
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b. Bring Discovery Rights in Line with Federal Discovery
Rights
Civilian and military courts share a basic understanding of an accused
service member’s discovery rights. CAAF, however, expanded on the
discovery rights guaranteed to accused service members. Through its
determination that “[m]ilitary law provides a much more direct and
generally broader means of discovery by an accused than is normally
available to him in civilian courts,” CAAF prescribed a liberal discovery
standard “across the board as an absolute binding mandate.”250 Under this
standard, government counsel should “generally resolve any questionable
issue involving discovery in favor of disclosure directly to defense counsel
or through in camera inspection by the trial judge.”251
This standard has consequences in trial practice within the military
justice system. Because the current military justice process requires and
mandates government discovery to the defense at various stages—including
prior to an Article 32 hearing, upon service of charges, and prior to trial—
prosecutors spend much of their time scrambling to adhere to the liberal
discovery mandates.252 When defense counsel submits a discovery request,
government counsel must presume that all the requested information is
material, and therefore provide the information.253 Coupled with the CAAF
requirement that the government is responsible for providing all
information within the liberally construed possession of the government,
military prosecutors become overwhelmed with locating and perfecting
discovery, adding time and delay to the process.254
The federal system provides a more efficient model to provide the
accused with discovery rights. While the federal system complies with the
standard discovery responsibilities, to include Brady255 and Jenck’s Act256
requirements, it does not establish a liberal discovery standard throughout
the process. Instead, individual civilian courts “may vary in their
interpretation of certain discovery rules.”257 Based upon this standard, the
250. Hernandez & Ferguson, supra note 98, at 222 (quoting United States v. Reece, 25 M.J.
93, 94 (C.M.A. 1987)).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 224.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that criminal defendants
possess a constitutional right to receive all exculpatory evidence in the government’s possession).
256. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006); Hernandez & Ferguson, supra note 98, at 206 ( “[T]he Jencks
Act requires that the prosecutor disclose pretrial statements or reports of a government witness,
once that witness has testified on direct examination.”).
257. Hernandez & Ferguson, supra note 98, at 222.
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military justice system could require the government to provide essential
discovery material, such as exculpatory evidence and statements made by
government witnesses when subject to direct examination, while also
allowing the government to contest the materiality of defense-requested
discovery that does not fall within those categories. By doing so, the
government will be able to proceed with the case and not become muddled
in defense discovery request quagmires prior to trial.
3. Trial Reforms
The due process rights afforded to accused service members during
trial—the right to an attorney, a jury, a military judge, and the confrontation
clause, to name a few—generally mirror the rights afforded to accused
defendants in the federal system. However, the military justice system
gives extra rights that resemble veto powers over remote testimony and
joint trials that civilian defendants do not possess. By limiting these rights,
commanders would have additional options in bringing accused service
members to trial, which, at times, would also quicken the process.
a. Allow Witness Testimony via VTC
The expeditionary nature of military service presents a unique
challenge to the military justice system. By the time a case proceeds to
court-martial, trial participants, including witnesses and investigators, may
have moved on geographically to other assignments, separated from
military service, or deployed overseas.258 Consequently, in preparation for
trial, government attorneys must locate these witnesses, secure their travel
back to the location of the court-martial, and ensure that these witnesses are
available for the court-martial when scheduled.259 These responsibilities
come at great cost. The convening authority must pay for the travel, and
often, especially when the service member is deployed, this travel impacts
the military mission.260 Similarly, locating and transporting the witnesses
and scheduling the trial to minimize mission disturbance adds time to the
court-martial process.261
The military justice system that is currently in place does not reflect
these unique witness availability challenges. While the military justice
system currently permits remote testimony in courts-martial, both parties
must agree to its use. As such, an accused service member may prohibit the
258.
259.
260.
261.

REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 103.
Id. at 103-04.
Id. at 104.
Id.
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use of remote testimony, which the military judge is obliged to follow.262
By removing the accused service member's ability to effectively veto the
use of remote testimony, military prosecutors will be able to rely on
technology, such as VTC, to secure the testimony of geographically
This
separated witnesses, which will save time and resources.263
expediency will come at minimal costs to the accused service members
because the improvement in VTC technology still allows them to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses.264
b. Remove the Preference Against Trying Multiple
Accused Service Members Together
The military justice system deviates from the federal system in regards
to trying multiple accused individuals together when their offenses arise
from the same misconduct. In the federal system, the preference is to try
these individuals together.265 The Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded
federal courts that “[t]here is a preference in the federal system for joint
trials of defendants who are indicted together.”266 As the Supreme Court
explained, “‘[j]oint trials ‘play a vital role in the criminal justice system.’
They promote efficiency and ‘serve the interests of justice by avoiding the
scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.’”267
The military justice system, though, prefers that each accused service
member be tried individually. In practice, if the convening authority refers
multiple accused service members to a combined court-martial, any of the
service members can move to sever the charges, and the military judge must
oblige. The basis of this preference is the issue of forum selection.268 The
military justice system provides each service member the right to elect their
trial forum; as such, one service member may elect trial by military judge
alone, whereas the other service member may request trial by officer and
enlisted panel members.269

262. Id. at 104-05; R.C.M. 703.
263. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 105. See also Maryland v. Craig,
497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990) (finding that remote-means testimony is permitted when (1) “denial of
such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy,” and (2) “the reliability of
the testimony is otherwise assured.”).
264. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 106.
265. Id. at 99. See also Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 536 (1993); United States v.
Bordeaux, 84 F.3d 1544, 1547 (8th Cir. 1996).
266. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 537.
267. Id. at 537 (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209, 210 (1987)).
268. R.C.M. 812 (discussion) (“Where different elections are made (and, when necessary
approved) as to court-martial composition a severance is necessary.”).
269. Id.
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The preference for trying service members separately for shared offenses
serves to prolong the court-martial process. Rather than proceeding through
the pretrial, trial, and post-trial process once, the government must go
through each process multiple times, adding time to the court-martial
process.270 By giving commanders the option to try multiple accused at
once, commanders are able to quickly try these cases and gain efficiencies
of time and resources that would facilitate good order and discipline within
their units.271 Again, this efficiency comes at a minimal cost to accused
service members; the convening authority can still provide each individual
accused service member with his or her forum rights. For example:
[S]hould one accused request trial by judge alone and one
accused request trial by panel members, the convening
authority could seat a panel to decide the case of the
member requesting trial by military panel while the military
judge decides the case of the service member requesting
trial by judge alone.272
4.

Post-Trial Reforms—Review the Appellate Process

The due process right of appellate review is one of those basic due
process rights that has become so important and ingrained into the military
justice system that Congress and the military departments cannot
completely do away with it. At the same time, however, Congress and the
military departments must acknowledge and face the difficulties that
appellate review has on the military justice trinity. Appellate review is not
only a lengthy process, but since their creation, the military appellate courts
have repeatedly created additional due process rights for accused service
members.273 Should Congress and the military departments elect to limit
accused service members’ rights to expedite the court-martial process, the
military appellate courts may undermine their efforts and either restore
extra-constitutional due process rights or create additional rights.
Thus, Congress and the military departments should examine
alternative means of appellate review. Several possibilities exist. First,
Congress and the military departments may expand the types of cases that
undergo appellate review by the department’s TJAG and limit review by the
military appeal courts to only the most extreme cases, specifically those
where the accused service member has been sentenced to life in
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REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 101-02.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 102.
See generally GENEROUS, supra note 19, at 96-106.
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confinement or to death.274 Second, Congress and the military departments
could elect to leave the military appellate court’s jurisdiction as is and
instead limit their authority and standards of review.275 Under this
approach, accused service members may have their cases reviewed, but the
military appellate courts may be limited in their ability to establish new due
process rights.
B. CREATING A CULTURAL EMPHASIS ON GOOD ORDER AND
DISCIPLINE
An appropriate military justice trinity requires more than scaling back
identifiable excesses in due process. There remains the omnipresent
possibility that remaining extra-constitutional due process rights may
increasingly impede the court-martial process or that Congress, the
President, the appellate process, or the military departments may introduce
additional due process rights. Conversely, the de-escalation of due process
may go too far, with the military departments and Congress taking away too
many essential due process rights, resulting in de-legitimized punishment.
Hence, the military departments must develop a culture built upon the
military justice trinity that emphasizes the primacy of fair and just good
order and discipline. To do so, the MCM’s stated end and purpose of
military law should be reformed to reflect that good order and discipline is
the end and purpose of military law, with the military justice system and
due process supporting and legitimizing good order and discipline.276 With
the appropriate culture in place, the military justice trinity can preserve a
proper balance.

274. The appellate courts review cases under UCMJ art. 66. Article 66 requires the service
TJAGs to refer to a court of criminal appeals any case “in which the sentence, as approved,
extends to death, dismissal of a commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman, dishonorable or badconduct discharge, or confinement for one year or more.” UCMJ art. 66(b); see also UCMJ art.
69(a)-(b). Under Article 69(a), each department’s TJAG reviews cases where the sentence did not
contain one year of confinement or a punitive discharge (cases not reviewed under Article 66,
UCMJ). Article 69(a) allows the departments’ TJAGS to review whether “any part of the findings
or sentence is found to be unsupported in law or if reassessment of the sentence is appropriate.”
UCMJ art. 69(a). Article 69(b) permits the TJAGs to review the findings or sentence of any case
not reviewed under Article 66 “on the ground of newly discovered evidence, fraud on the court,
lack of jurisdiction over the accused or the offense, error prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused, or the appropriateness of the sentence.” UCMJ art. 69(b).
275. UCMJ art. 66(f) permits each department’s TJAG to “prescribe uniform rules of
procedure for Courts of Criminal Appeals.” UCMJ art. 66(f).
276. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL supra note 77, at I-1.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The past few years have not been kind to military justice. As Congress
and the public turn their attention to the perceived failures of the military
justice system, which are highlighted by the increase in sexual assault and
misconduct in the deployed environment, the military departments must
respond and reform. A failure to do so will not only jeopardize mission
readiness, as each of these offenses strikes at good order and discipline
within the military, but also may cause reform to be imposed upon the
military departments. To address these issues, the military departments
must understand what underlies the apparent increase in service member
misconduct. Only once the military departments have an explanation can
they craft an appropriate solution.
The explanation and solution for this rash of military misconduct lies
in good order and discipline.
Good order and discipline allows
commanders to order their service members to kill in combat, to restrain
from using force in a COIN operation, and to place the interests of their unit
above their own. Good order and discipline should prevent service
members from engaging in sexual assault, murdering civilian noncombatants in the deployed environment, and conducting themselves in an
unethical and criminal manner. Yet, service members continue to engage in
these crimes despite UCMJ provisions prohibiting such conduct, senior
leaders regularly speaking out and warning against such conduct, and the
public and Congress continuing to take notice.
The reason for this breakdown in good order and discipline is that
good order and discipline does not operate in a vacuum. Instead, good
order and discipline is a prong in the military justice trinity where the
military justice system, due process, and good order and discipline, working
in an interconnected manner, combine together to prevent service member
misconduct. In an ideal balance, a commander can use the military justice
system, legitimized and supported by due process, to effectuate good order
and discipline within his or her unit. The commander can establish a “state
of mind that produces proper action and prompt cooperation under all
circumstances”277 through the threat of punishment via the military justice
system. Service members, viewing this process as legitimate due to the
fairness afforded by due process, will then be deterred from engaging in
misconduct.
Commanders, though, cannot currently use this military justice trinity
to establish a state of mind within their subordinate service members to

277. BENTON, supra note 173, at 41.
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refrain from engaging in serious misconduct. Beginning with World War I,
Congress, the military departments, and the military appellate courts have
gradually increased the due process rights afforded to accused service
members, thereby strengthening the due process prong of the military
justice trinity. The bolstered due process prong, in turn, impacted the
military justice system prong. The court-martial process, once the primary
tool utilized to preserve good order and discipline, became a timeconsuming and cumbersome option for commanders. Commanders,
seeking swift and efficient justice, turned away from the court-martial and
instead utilized nonjudicial punishment and administrative discharges to
effectuate good order and discipline.
The weakened military justice prong subsequently impacted the good
order and discipline prong. Commanders must utilize not only positive
means to achieve good order and discipline within their units, but also
negative means. To deter misconduct, commanders require the capacity to
impose punishment. It is the military justice system that affords that
capacity. In addition, for punishment to deter misconduct, it must be
credible, severe, swift, and possess collateral consequences. Without an
efficient or frequent court-martial tool, commanders no longer have access
to punishment necessary to deter misconduct. Therefore, commanders can
no longer properly effectuate good order and discipline.
As they search for solutions to the rash of misconduct, the military
departments must again rely upon good order and discipline. By doing so,
the military departments will embed in their service members the
“intelligent, willing, and positive”278 obedience to the military justice
system and prohibitions against engaging in such misconduct. The military
departments can only do so, however, by balancing the military justice
trinity. Good order and discipline requires a fully realized court-martial
process that can be used with frequency and celerity. The military
departments can only restore the court-martial process by reducing the due
process rights afforded to accused service members. They must proceed
carefully, however, as due process legitimizes the military justice system
and good order and discipline. Consequently, the military departments
should direct their focus on reducing the extra-constitutional due process
rights of accused service members, which unduly lengthen and burden the
court-martial process, while maintaining the constitutionally afforded due
process rights of accused service members.

278. BENTON, supra note 173, at 41.

